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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
  
COSO sponsored this study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between January 1998 and 
December 2007. This study updates our understanding of fraud since COSO’s 1999 
issuance of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997. Some of the more critical 
findings of the present study are: 
 
 There were 347 alleged cases of public company fraudulent financial reporting from 
1998 to 2007, versus 294 cases from 1987 to 1997. Consistent with the high-profile 
frauds at Enron, WorldCom, etc., the dollar magnitude of fraudulent financial 
reporting soared in the last decade, with total cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation of nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available 
information (mean of nearly $400 million per case). This compares to a mean of $25 
million per sample fraud in COSO’s 1999 study. While the largest frauds of the early 
2000s skewed the 1998-2007 total and mean cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation upward, the median fraud of $12.05 million in the present study 
also was nearly three times larger than the median fraud of $4.1 million in the 1999 
COSO study.  
 
 The companies allegedly engaging in financial statement fraud had median assets 
and revenues just under $100 million. These companies were much larger than 
fraud companies in the 1999 COSO study, which had median assets and revenues 
under $16 million. 
 
 The SEC named the CEO and/or CFO for some level of involvement in 89 percent of 
the fraud cases, up from 83 percent of cases in 1987-1997. Within two years of the 
completion of the SEC’s investigation, about 20 percent of CEOs/CFOs had been 
indicted and over 10 percent had been convicted. 
 
 The most common fraud technique involved improper revenue recognition, 
followed by the overstatement of existing assets or capitalization of expenses. 
Revenue frauds accounted for over 60 percent of the cases, versus 50 percent in 
1987-1997. 
 
 Relatively few differences in board of director characteristics existed between firms 
engaging in fraud and similar firms not engaging in fraud. Also, in some instances, 
noted differences were in directions opposite of what might be expected. These 
results suggest the importance of research on governance processes and the 
interaction of various governance mechanisms. 
 
 Twenty-six percent of the fraud firms changed auditors between the last clean 
financial statements and the last fraudulent financial statements, whereas only 12 
percent of no-fraud firms switched auditors during that same time. Sixty percent of 
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the fraud firms that changed auditors did so during the fraud period, while the 
remaining 40 percent changed in the fiscal period just before the fraud began. 
 
 Initial news in the press of an alleged fraud resulted in an average 16.7 percent 
abnormal stock price decline in the two days surrounding the news announcement. 
In addition, news of an SEC or Department of Justice investigation resulted in an 
average 7.3 percent abnormal stock price decline. 
 
 Long-term negative consequences of fraud were apparent. Companies engaged in 
fraud often experienced bankruptcy, delisting from a stock exchange, or material 
asset sales following discovery of fraud – at rates much higher than those 
experienced by no-fraud firms. 
 
Given the small number of frauds examined in this study that involve time periods 
subsequent to the issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, further research will be 
needed once sufficient time has passed to allow for more observations of SEC fraud 
investigations involving post-SOX time periods before any conclusions can be reached 
about the effectiveness of that legislation in reducing instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting.   
 
Our hope is that insights contained herein will encourage additional research to better 
understand organizational behaviors, leadership dynamics, and other important 
aspects of the financial reporting process that may have an impact on fraud prevention, 
deterrence, and detection.  
 
We believe the results of this study will be useful to investors, regulators, stock 
exchanges, boards of directors, external auditors, and other key stakeholders as they 
seek to prevent, deter, and detect fraudulent financial reporting.  
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Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007 
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I. Introduction, Key Findings, and Insights 
Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant consequences for the organization 
and its stakeholders, as well as for public confidence in capital markets. Periodic high 
profile cases of fraudulent financial reporting raise concerns about the credibility of the 
U.S. financial reporting process and call into question the roles of management, 
auditors, regulators, and analysts, among others. 
 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) sponsored this research project to provide an extensive updated analysis of 
financial statement fraud occurrences affecting U.S. public companies. In the mid-1980s, 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, sponsored by COSO, 
identified numerous causal factors believed to contribute to financial statement fraud 
(NCFFR 1987).1 In addition, the COSO-sponsored study released in 1999, Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, provided a 
comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting through the late 1990s 
(Beasley et al. 1999). 
 
Less is known about the profile of fraudulent financial reporting since 1997.2 
While the U.S. experienced an unprecedented spate of large company accounting frauds 
in 2001 and 2002, including those at Enron and WorldCom, it is unclear to what extent 
the typical fraud profile has changed in the past decade. Thus, COSO commissioned this 
research project to provide COSO, and others, with recent information that can be used 
to guide future efforts to combat the problem of financial statement fraud and to 
provide a better understanding of financial statement fraud cases.  
 
This research has three specific objectives: 
 
 To identify instances of alleged fraudulent financial reporting by registrants of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosed by the SEC in an 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) issued during the period 
1998-2007. 
                                                 
1 We use the terms “fraudulent financial reporting” and “financial statement fraud” interchangeably 
throughout this document to represent the intentional material misstatement of financial statements or 
financial disclosures (in notes to the financial statements or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings) or the perpetration of an illegal act that has a material direct effect on the financial statements or 
financial disclosures. 
2 Others have studied aspects of fraudulent financial reporting since COSO’s 1999 study was released. For 
example, see Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SEC 2003), Ten Things About 
Financial Statement Fraud – Second Edition (Deloitte 2008a), Ten Things About the Consequences of 
Financial Statement Fraud (Deloitte 2008b), and Ten Things About Financial Statement Fraud – Third 
Edition (Deloitte 2009). 
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 To examine certain key company and management characteristics for the 
companies involved in instances of financial statement fraud identified in AAERs 
and to compare certain fraud company characteristics to those of no-fraud control 
firms. 
 To provide insights related to preventing, deterring, and detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting. 
 
This study builds on the previous COSO-sponsored study, Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting: 1987-1997. Where possible, we use or adapt language from the prior report, 
and we compare key findings from this study to our findings in the 1999 study to 
highlight notable differences. 
 
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial reporting alleged by the SEC in 
AAERs issued during the ten-year period between January 1998 and December 2007. 
The AAERs, which contain summaries of enforcement actions by the SEC against public 
companies, represent one of the most comprehensive sources of alleged cases of 
financial statement fraud in the U.S. We focused on AAERs that involved an alleged 
violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 
1933 Securities Act given that these represent the primary antifraud provisions related 
to financial reporting for U.S. public companies. Our focus was on cases clearly 
involving financial statement fraud. We excluded from our analysis restatements of 
financial statements due to errors or earnings management activities that did not result 
in a violation of the federal antifraud statutes. 
 
Our search identified 347 companies involved in alleged instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting during the ten-year period. These 347 alleged fraud instances are 
described in 1,335 individual AAERs (1,013 AAERs directly relate to fraud, while the 
other 322 describe non-fraud allegations related to the fraud companies). Findings 
reported in this study are based on information we obtained from our detailed analysis 
of (a) AAERs related to each of the sample fraud companies, (b) databases containing 
selected financial statement data reported in Form 10-Ks filed before and during the 
period the alleged financial statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued 
during the alleged fraud period, and (d) databases containing business press articles 
about the sample companies after the fraud was disclosed, as well as about the no-fraud 
control firms.  
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KEY FINDINGS AND INSIGHTS 
 
Several key findings and insights emerge from the detailed analysis of the 347 financial 
statement fraud cases. COSO hopes that close evaluation of these findings and insights 
will spawn ideas and further research that will help to strengthen the prevention, 
deterrence, and detection of fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Occurrences of Financial Statement Fraud 
 
The vast majority of public companies appear to provide financial reports that are free 
from material misstatements due to fraud. However, financial statement fraud 
continued to exist during the 1998-2007 time frame, including the well-publicized 
frauds at Enron and WorldCom, among others. During the ten-year period 1998-2007, 
the SEC alleged fraud involving 347 companies as described in 1,335 AAERs. In 
comparison, the 1999 COSO study spanned 11 years of SEC fraud investigations in 
which nearly 300 frauds were described in over 800 AAERs. Despite thousands of 
publicly-traded companies filing apparently fairly stated financial statements over the 
ten-year period, the existence of fraud in any one of the 347 cases is significant to 
stakeholders of the affected entity. In addition, while the incidence of SEC fraud cases 
increased somewhat from 1987-1997 to 1998-2007, the magnitude of individual fraud 
cases increased markedly, as discussed below. Continued focus on finding ways to 
strengthen financial statement fraud prevention, deterrence, and detection is 
warranted. 
 
Companies Involved 
 
Fraud affects companies of all sizes. The companies committing fraud had median 
revenues and total assets just under $100 million in the period prior to the fraud. While 
the size of companies in this study was much larger than in COSO’s 1999 study, which 
had median total assets of approximately $15 million, the range of assets or revenues 
for companies experiencing fraud was large. Fraud companies included startups with 
no assets or revenues, as well as companies with just under $400 billion in assets or 
over $100 billion in revenues. Thus, fraud is not limited to companies of a certain size.   
 
Similarly, fraud occurred in a variety of industries. Consistent with COSO’s 1999 
study, the most frequent industries where fraud occurred included computer hardware 
and software (20 percent of the fraud companies) and other manufacturing (20 
percent). These findings suggest that any actions to prevent, deter, or detect fraud 
should not be limited to any particular industry.  
 
Most fraud companies’ common stock (73 percent3 of the sample) traded in 
over-the-counter markets and was not listed on the New York or American Stock 
Exchanges, similar to the frauds examined in COSO’s 1999 study. Further study about 
                                                 
3 Fifty percent of the firms were listed on NASDAQ, and 23 percent of the firms were traded on electronic 
bulletin boards, pink sheets, or via other over-the-counter markets. 
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differences in exchange listing requirements may provide insights as to whether certain 
requirements for registrants of the larger exchanges are relevant to the over-the-
counter markets. 
 
Financial Health of Companies Involved 
 
Some companies committing fraud were experiencing net losses or were in close to 
break-even positions in periods before the fraud. The lowest quartile reflected 
companies in a net loss position and suffering from net operating cash flow shortages. 
Median company net income was $875,000, while median cash flow from operations 
was $317,000. Such closeness to breakeven positions is consistent with results in 
COSO’s 1999 study. Thus, pressures of financial strain or distress may have provided 
incentives for fraudulent activities for some fraud companies. Enhanced skepticism 
when companies are experiencing financial stress may be warranted for key 
governance participants, including the board of directors, auditors, and regulators.  
 
Management’s Tone at the Top 
 
We gathered information about the types of individuals named by the SEC in the AAERs. 
The SEC continues to name senior management in AAERs for some level of involvement 
in the fraud, with the CEO and/or CFO named in almost all cases. These findings have 
important implications for the control environment. 
 
Executives Named 
 
In 72 percent of the cases, the AAERs named the CEO, and in 65 percent the AAERs 
named the CFO as being associated with the fraud. When considered together, in 89 
percent of the cases, the AAERs named the CEO and/or CFO as being associated with the 
financial statement fraud. In COSO’s 1999 study, the CEO and/or CFO were named in 83 
percent of the cases. In addition, although the incidence of enforcement actions against 
the CEO was the same in the current study as in the 1999 study (72 percent of cases in 
each period), enforcement actions against the CFO were approximately 50 percent 
more likely in the current study (65 percent of cases, versus 43 percent in COSO’s 1999 
study).  
 
More study is needed to determine if there are leading practices that help to 
reduce the risk of senior management involvement in financial statement fraud. For 
example, emerging practices may exist related to the screening and selection of senior 
executive officers, how they are compensated to avoid excessive fraud risks, and how 
boards and others oversee senior management. Mechanisms for sharing of those 
practices with wider audiences may need to be considered. In addition, CPA firms may 
want to focus additional effort on assessing the integrity of top management and 
sharing with the profession those approaches that prove effective. 
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Alleged Motivations 
 
The SEC’s most commonly cited motivations for fraud included the need to meet 
internal or external earnings expectations, an attempt to conceal the company’s 
deteriorating financial condition, the need to increase the stock price, the need to 
bolster financial performance for pending equity or debt financing, or the desire to 
increase management compensation based on financial results. 
 
Better understanding of the psyche of individuals who have engaged in fraud 
may provide insights as to factors that cause an individual to set aside his or her set of 
beliefs to engage in fraud. More can be learned about behavioral aspects that lead to 
attitudes and rationalizations that ultimately result in an individual or group of 
individuals deciding to engage in fraudulent financial reporting (see Ramamoorti 
2008). Insights are needed as to factors that might lead an individual known to be of 
high integrity and to possess strong ethical values to subsequently justify committing a 
fraudulent act. Perhaps insights from prior research studies about leadership and other 
organizational behaviors in settings not involving fraud may have insights about 
possible motivators of fraudulent financial reporting. The academic community may be 
able to provide analyses or syntheses of findings and insights from prior organizational 
behavior research that would be helpful in identifying organizational behavior 
characteristics that may be associated with drivers of fraudulent financial reporting.    
 
More guidance about how management’s philosophy, integrity, and ethical 
culture interact with judgment and decision making is warranted. Insights about these 
interactions may serve to strengthen assessments of fraud risk conditions, especially 
those related to the attitudes and rationalizations of senior management in high fraud 
risk environments. 
 
Nature of the Frauds 
 
We gathered extensive information from the AAERs about the nature of the frauds, 
including the amounts involved, the fraud periods, and techniques used. 
 
Size and Time Period of the Frauds 
 
For the period 1998-2007, the total cumulative misstatement or misappropriation was 
nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available information (mean of nearly 
$400 million per case). This compares to a mean of $25 million of misstatement or 
misappropriation per sample fraud in COSO’s 1999 study. While the largest frauds of 
the early 2000s skewed the 1998-2007 total and mean cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation upward, the median fraud of $12.05 million in the present study also 
was nearly three times larger than the median fraud of $4.1 million in the 1999 COSO 
study. Thus, the magnitude of the fraud problem has increased in the past decade. 
 
Most frauds were not isolated to a single fiscal period. The average fraud period 
extended 31.4 months, with the median fraud period extending 24 months. This was 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 10 
slightly longer than the average and median fraud periods of 23.7 and 21 months, 
respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999 study. This finding suggests that once fraud is 
initiated in one financial period (quarterly or annual), management often continues to 
perpetrate fraud in each quarterly and annual financial statement filing for about two 
years. 
 
 Because there is a significant time lag between the occurrence of fraudulent 
financial reporting and the issuance of an AAER related to that fraud instance, most of 
the underlying instances of fraudulent financial reporting described in the AAERs 
examined in this study occurred before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX). Only 61 of the 347 fraud companies examined in this study issued fraudulent 
financial statements involving periods subsequent to 2002, and only a small number of 
firms were subject to the provisions of Section 404 of SOX. Thus, future research is 
warranted to understand the impact of SOX on fraudulent financial reporting.  It is 
premature to draw conclusions about the fraud detection impact of that legislation 
based on the frauds examined in this study. Furthermore, the approach used in this 
study does not allow us to provide any insights about the effect of SOX in preventing or 
deterring fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Fraud Techniques 
 
The two most common techniques used to fraudulently misstate the financial 
statements involved improper revenue recognition and asset overstatements. The 
majority of frauds (61 percent) involved revenue recognition, while 51 percent 
involved overstated assets primarily by overvaluing existing assets or capitalizing 
expenses. The understatement of expenses and liabilities was much less frequent (18 
percent). Misappropriation of assets occurred in 14 percent of the fraud cases, which 
was similar to the 12 percent reported in COSO’s 1999 study. 
 
 The occurrence of improper revenue recognition (61 percent) was higher than 
the rate of occurrence (50 percent) reported in COSO’s 1999 study. Close examination 
of revenue accounting and related fraud techniques is needed to better understand how 
revenue recognition is used to distort financial statement information. More detailed 
analysis of revenue fraud risk may be needed within industries to strengthen 
understanding of how revenue is fraudulently misstated. To the extent that improper 
revenue recognition involves non-financial executives, better education and training on 
revenue recognition concepts and SEC reporting obligations are needed. 
 
Valuation issues related to recording existing assets deserve more focus, given 
that a majority of frauds involved asset overstatements. This concern may be 
heightened as financial reporting valuations become more dependent on fair value 
accounting. 
 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 11 
Role of the Board of Directors 
 
One of the major contributions of this study is the comparative analysis of board 
governance characteristics between fraud firms and a similar set of no-fraud firms. This 
allows us to observe whether certain board characteristics are more likely to be 
associated with fraud firms relative to no-fraud firms. 
 
Full Board of Directors 
 
The overarching insight from the analysis of differences in board characteristics 
between fraud and no-fraud firms is the lack of notable differences in many of the 
governance characteristics that have been the focus of regulators, exchanges, and 
governance experts in the last several years. For example, firms engaging in fraudulent 
financial reporting had more inside directors (i.e., management) than no-fraud firms 
during the sub-period 1991-1999.4 However, following changes in stock exchange 
listing requirements implemented by the major U.S. exchanges, statistically significant 
differences in the composition of boards no longer existed between fraud and no-fraud 
firms in 2001-2004. Furthermore, while there are some differences in certain board 
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms that are statistically significant, in 
many instances the practical significance of those differences is not overwhelming.  
 
Additional research and information-gathering about board processes may be 
needed to determine if there are certain board actions or tasks that impact fraud risk 
oversight, including board group dynamics, process flow, and board judgment and 
decision-making. Perhaps processes related to board agenda setting, the manner in 
which information is shared and discussed among the board members, and interactions 
between the board and management differ between fraud and no-fraud firms. More 
study is warranted. 
 
Audit Committee 
 
With all the focus on audit committees in the last decade, one of the important insights 
from this study is that meaningful differences in audit committee characteristics 
between fraud and no-fraud firms are generally no longer observed.  For example, 
almost all fraud and no-fraud firms had audit committees; the average audit committee 
size for both groups was about three members; and on average, audit committees of 
both groups met nearly four times per year.  
 
                                                 
4 Our sample period overlapped the widely recognized Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) 
1999). That report resulted in several changes in stock exchange listing requirements related to board 
governance made in 2000 by both the NYSE and NASDAQ. As a result, we partitioned our analysis of the 
data into two sub-periods, 1991-1999 and 2001-2004, based on the first fraud year. As explained later in 
this document, we excluded from this sub-analysis frauds occurring in the year 2000 because the stock 
exchanges made changes to their listing requirements in 2000. 
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While many audit committee characteristics have been the focus of audit 
committee reform and regulation over the past decade, there is little evidence that 
these characteristics are associated with the occurrence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. Although we no longer see meaningful differences in most audit committee 
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms, this does not mean that all audit 
committees are similarly effective with respect to preventing, deterring, and detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. Future research may be needed that focuses on the 
interaction of other governance mechanisms (e.g., the nominating committee) with the 
audit committee’s ability to prevent, deter, and detect fraudulent financial reporting 
(see Carcello et al. 2010). And, future research about audit committee processes may be 
needed to determine if other characteristics and behaviors of audit committees have an 
impact on the prevention, deterrence, or detection of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Compensation Committee 
 
Greater focus on the roles and processes used by compensation committees may 
provide helpful insights as to how boards consider the impact of compensation policies 
on the risk of fraud. Most fraud and no-fraud firms maintained a compensation 
committee, and there were few differences in compensation committee characteristics 
between fraud firms and no-fraud firms. Because compensation arrangements for 
senior executives are often tied to financial statement measures, more study about the 
effect of compensation policies and processes on fraud risk and board oversight of that 
risk may be needed. 
 
Related Party Transactions 
 
Fraud firms disclosed significantly more related party transactions than no-fraud firms. 
Seventy-nine percent of fraud firms had disclosed a related party transaction in the 
proxy statement filed during the first fraud period compared to 71 percent of no-fraud 
firms for the comparable time period. The higher frequency of related party 
transactions for fraud firms suggests that the presence of related party transactions 
may reflect heightened fraud risk. Greater scrutiny of related party transactions may be 
warranted to determine if the nature of those transactions has broader implications 
regarding management’s integrity, philosophy, and ethical culture.  
 
Auditor Considerations 
 
Fraud goes undetected by auditors of all types and sizes. Big Six/Four firms audited 79 
percent of the fraud companies during the fraud period (similar for the no-fraud firms 
at 83 percent). The challenges of detecting fraudulent misstatements of financial 
information affect auditors of entities spanning numerous industries and different sizes. 
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Type of Auditor Opinion on the Financial Statements 
 
Virtually all of the fraud firms received an unqualified opinion on the last set of 
fraudulently misstated financial statements. However, the unqualified audit report of 
fraud firms was more likely (56 percent) to contain additional explanatory language 
than for no-fraud firms (36 percent). More research is needed to examine the nature of 
the audit report modification and to determine if there is any relation between the 
report modification and the nature of the fraud technique employed. 
 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
Because of the significant time lag between the occurrence of fraud and the subsequent 
issuance by the SEC of an AAER, only a small number of the 347 instances of fraud 
affected accelerated filers subject to Section 404 of SOX. For those firms, the nature of 
the Section 404 internal control opinions did not foreshadow future financial reporting 
problems. The Section 404 opinions indicated effective internal controls unless there 
had already been a restatement or other correction of a 10-K announced. Therefore, 
adverse Section 404 opinions for the small sample examined were not diagnostic of 
future reporting problems, but instead only highlighted already-announced reporting 
problems.   
 
The small sample size available for analysis limits our ability to draw any 
significant insights about auditors’ ability to detect internal control weaknesses that 
may lead to fraud in the future. It also is important to note that we are unable to 
measure the impact of Section 404 in preventing or deterring management from 
engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Auditor Change and Auditor Implications 
 
The rate of auditor changes for fraud firms was double the rate of auditor changes for 
the similar set of no-fraud firms. Twenty-six percent of the fraud firms versus 12 
percent of the no-fraud firms changed auditors between the period that the company 
issued the last clean financial statements and the period the company issued the last set 
of fraudulent financial statements. Sixty percent of the auditor changes for fraud firms 
occurred during the fraud period, while the remaining 40 percent of fraud firms that 
changed auditors did so during the fiscal period just before the fraud began. A detailed 
hindsight analysis of auditor changes involving known instances of fraud may provide 
helpful insights about potential relations between conditions leading to auditor changes 
and conditions related to fraud occurrences. 
 
 Financial statement fraud sometimes implicated the external auditor. Auditors 
were named in the AAERs for 78 of the 342 fraud cases (23 percent) where AAERs 
named individuals. This was somewhat lower than what was reported (29 percent) in 
COSO’s 1999 study. When auditors were named in the AAERs, about 39 percent of those 
named were charged with violating the anti-fraud statutes, while the remaining 61 
percent were charged with violating non-fraud provisions including Rule 102(e) of the 
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1934 Securities Exchange Act. National audit firms were less likely to be named in an 
SEC enforcement action than were non-national firms, even though national firms 
audited most of the fraud companies.  
 
  Consequences for Individuals and Firms Engaged in Fraud 
 
We gathered extensive data about consequences affecting both individuals serving in 
management roles and the companies as a whole for a period of two years subsequent 
to the issuance of the last AAER about the fraud. The pairing of fraud firms with no-
fraud firms allowed us to analyze whether subsequent events affecting individuals and 
the company as a whole were significantly different for fraud firms relative to no-fraud 
firms. 
  
Consequences for Individuals 
 
The consequences associated with financial statement fraud were severe for individuals 
allegedly involved. In almost half of the cases (47 percent), the SEC barred one or more 
individuals from serving as an officer or director of a public company. Civil fines were 
imposed in 65 percent of the fraud cases, and disgorgements were imposed in 43 
percent of the cases. The average fine imposed by the SEC was $12.4 million, and the 
average disgorgement was $18.1 million. The cumulative amount of fines for all 347 
fraud companies was $2.74 billion, while the cumulative amount of disgorgements was 
$2.65 billion. The median fine was $100,000, and the median disgorgement was 
$195,000.  
 
Most CEOs and CFOs (80 percent or more) left the company within two years of 
the SEC’s last AAER related to the fraud. Twenty-one percent of CEOs were indicted 
within that time period, and 64 percent of the indicted CEOs were convicted. Similarly, 
17 percent of CFOs were indicted, with 75 percent of the indicted CFOs being convicted. 
 
Despite the magnitude of these individual consequences, the severity of the 
penalties may not be a sufficient deterrent. More understanding about the mindset of 
fraud perpetrators may be needed to understand the factors individuals take into 
account when they engage in fraudulent activity. Better understanding of their 
perceptions about possible long-term consequences for engaging in fraud may provide 
useful perspectives about the deterrence effect of personal consequences.  
 
Consequences for Companies Committing Fraud 
 
Severe consequences also awaited companies committing fraud. Companies 
experienced significant abnormal stock price declines as news of the alleged frauds first 
emerged. The average fraud company’s stock price dropped by an abnormal 16.7 
percent in the two days surrounding the initial press disclosures of an alleged fraud. 
Fraud company stock prices also abnormally declined an average of 7.3 percent in the 
two days surrounding the announcement of a fraud investigation by the SEC or 
Department of Justice. 
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In addition to the negative stock market reactions to news announcements about 
alleged fraud or fraud investigations, many fraud firms suffered long-term 
consequences, including bankruptcy, delisting by national exchanges, and material 
asset sales. Twenty-eight percent of fraud firms were bankrupt or liquidated within two 
years from the year in which the SEC issued the last AAER related to the fraud, and 47 
percent were delisted from a national stock exchange. Material asset sales also affected 
about 62 percent of fraud companies. These rates of occurrence were significantly 
higher than the experiences of no-fraud firms during those same time periods.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Detailed analyses of the findings described above are provided in the remainder of this 
report. We encourage parties involved in financial reporting to carefully consider the 
detailed information presented in this report. We also encourage further research to 
better understand many of the underlying factors likely to affect the prevention, 
deterrence, and detection of fraudulent financial reporting.   COSO hopes numerous 
parties will recommit their efforts to improve the prevention, deterrence, and detection 
of fraudulent financial reporting.  
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OVERVIEW OF REPORT 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of 
the approach we took to identify the cases of fraudulent financial reporting and 
contains a summary of the sources and methods used to gather data related to each 
case. Section III presents the results from our detailed analysis of the 347 cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Section IV provides concluding comments, and Section V 
contains a brief description of the authors who conducted this study. 
 
We are confident that this report, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, 
will prove helpful to parties concerned with corporate financial reporting and will add 
to the insights provided by COSO’s 1999 study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-
1997. We hope the study will stimulate greater awareness of new opportunities for 
improvements in the corporate financial reporting process, as well as avenues for 
future research. 
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II. Description of Research Approach 
 
This study builds on the previous COSO-sponsored study, Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting: 1987-1997, by presenting findings related to fraudulent financial reporting 
for the period 1998-2007. The data collection effort was conducted under the direction 
of four accounting researchers (“the authors”) who oversaw the entire study including 
generation of this monograph. The authors worked with two research managers, who 
monitored and reviewed the work of a data collection team (“the team”). The research 
managers reported to and consulted with the authors throughout the entire research 
process. 
 
 The first step in this research project involved the identification of all alleged 
instances of fraudulent financial reporting captured by the SEC in an AAER issued 
during the period 1998-2007. In order to obtain detailed publicly-available information 
about company-wide and management characteristics of companies involved, the focus 
of this study was on instances of fraudulent financial reporting allegedly committed by 
SEC registrants that ultimately led to the issuance of an AAER.5  
 
To identify instances of fraudulent financial reporting investigated by the SEC in 
the period 1998-2007, the team read all AAERs issued by the SEC between January 
1998 and December 2007. From the reading, the team identified all AAERs that 
involved an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or 
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. We focused on violations of these securities 
laws given that these sections of the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act are the primary antifraud provisions related to financial statement reporting. 
Because violations of these securities provisions generally require the intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud, they more specifically indicate alleged instances of financial 
statement fraud than do other provisions of the securities laws.6 
 
The AAERs represent one of the most comprehensive sources of alleged, 
discovered cases of financial statement fraud in the U.S. However, such an approach 
does limit the ability to generalize the results of this study to other settings. Because the 
identification of fraud cases was based on a review of AAERs, the findings are 
potentially biased by the enforcement strategies employed by the staff of the SEC. 
Because the SEC is faced with constrained resources, there is the possibility that not all 
cases of identified fraud occurring in the U.S. were addressed in the AAERs. There may 
be a heavier concentration of companies contained in the AAERs where the SEC 
assessed the probability of a successful finding of financial statement fraud as high. 
Also, the SEC may choose to conduct “sweeps” of particular industries or types of 
transactions, which may impact the distribution of fraud instances reported in AAERs. 
                                                 
5 Publicly-traded partnerships, broker-dealers, and unit investment trusts were excluded from this study. 
6 We did not include other violations of laws whose only consequence gave rise to a potential contingent 
liability (e.g., an “indirect effect illegal act” such as a violation of Environmental Protection Agency 
regulations). 
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In addition, the cases contained in the AAERs represent instances where the SEC alleged 
the presence of financial statement fraud. In most instances, the company and/or 
individuals named neither admitted nor denied guilt. To the extent that enforcement 
biases are present, the results of this study are limited. However, given no better 
publicly-available source of alleged financial statement fraud instances, we believe that 
this approach was optimal under the circumstances. Furthermore, any SEC fraud 
investigation is a significant event in the life of the affected company and individuals 
involved in the financial reporting process, including boards of directors and auditors. 
Thus, insight as to fraud occurrences investigated by the SEC is informative, regardless 
of any inherent biases that may be present in how the SEC selects its enforcement cases.  
 
For purposes of this report, the term “fraudulent financial reporting” represents 
the intentional material misstatement of financial statements or financial disclosures 
(in notes to the financial statements or SEC filings) or the perpetration of an illegal act 
that has a material direct effect on the financial statements or financial disclosures. The 
term financial statement fraud was distinguished from other causes of materially 
misleading financial statements, such as unintentional errors and other corporate 
improprieties that do not necessarily cause material inaccuracies in financial 
statements. Throughout this report, references to fraudulent financial reporting are all 
in the context of material misstatements. Our study excludes restatements of financial 
statements due to errors or earnings management activities that did not result in a 
violation of the federal antifraud securities provisions. 
 
 The team’s reading of AAERs during this period allowed us to develop a 
comprehensive list of companies investigated by the SEC during 1998-2007 for alleged 
financial statement fraud. The Team read 1,759 AAERs, beginning with AAER #1004 
and ending with AAER #2762. From this process, we identified 347 companies (1,335 
total AAERs for these 347 companies) involved in alleged instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting. For each of these companies, we accumulated information about the 
specific securities law violation to ensure that 
the case involved an alleged violation of Rule 
10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or 
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. 
 
 For each of the 347 companies, the team 
collected extensive information to create a comprehensive database of company and 
management characteristics surrounding instances of financial statement fraud from 
(a) AAERs related to the alleged fraud, (b) databases containing selected financial 
statement data reported in Form 10-Ks filed before and during the period the alleged 
financial statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged fraud 
period, and (d) databases of business press articles written about the sample 
companies after the fraud was revealed, as well as about the no-fraud control firms. 
SEC AAERs issued from 1998-
2007 addressed 347 instances of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
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Data Obtained from AAERs 
 
The team read all AAERs issued during 1998-2007 related to the alleged financial 
statement fraud for each of the sample companies. In many cases, several AAERs 
related to a single fraud at one company. From the reading, the team attempted to 
capture the following information: 
 
1. A list of the specific annual financial statements (contained in Form 10-Ks) or 
quarterly financial statements (contained in Form 10-Qs) fraudulently misstated 
and other filings with the SEC (e.g., S-1 registration statements) that 
incorporated fraudulently misstated financial statements. From this, we were 
able to determine the length of time the alleged fraud occurred.  
2. A brief description of the nature of the fraud allegations including a description 
of how the fraud was allegedly perpetrated. 
3. The dollar amounts of the fraud and the primary accounts affected. 
4. Identification of types of personnel and outsiders involved in the fraud. 
5. An indication of the alleged motivation for committing the fraud. 
6. The industry in which the company operated. 
7. A summary of the reported outcome of the SEC’s investigation, including 
disciplinary action against senior management personnel. 
 
Audited Financial Statement Data 
 
We obtained selected audited financial statement data from annual financial statements 
filed in a Form 10-K with the SEC. We used Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT® 
database to obtain selected balance sheet and income statement amounts from the 
audited financial statements included in the Form 10-K filed with the SEC for the fiscal 
period preceding the first known instance of fraudulently misstated financial 
statements for each of the sample companies (“last clean financial statements”). This 
provided us information about the financial position and results of operations in the 
period just before the period in which the fraud allegedly first occurred. 
 
We also obtained from COMPUSTAT® the name of the audit firm responsible for 
auditing the financial statements issued during the fraud period and the nature of the 
auditor’s opinion on those financial statements. If the fraud period extended more than 
one fiscal year, we obtained the name of the audit firm and the type of audit opinion 
issued for the last fiscal year of the fraud period.  
 
Data Obtained from Proxy Statements 
 
We obtained copies of the first proxy statement sent to shareholders during the period 
in which the alleged financial statement fraud was in process. We reviewed these proxy 
statements to gather information about the characteristics of the board of directors and 
its audit and compensation committees (composition, number of meetings, etc.) that 
were in place during the fraud period. 
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Data from Business Press Articles 
 
To obtain information about consequences for the company, senior management, and 
board members subsequent to the revelation of the financial statement fraud, we 
performed an extensive search of the Factiva database of financial press articles. Among 
the many news sources included in Factiva are over 5,000 newspapers, journals, and 
magazines, including The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Financial Times, 
and The Economist, and over 500 newswires including Dow Jones, Reuters, PR 
Newswire, and The Associated Press.  
 
For each fraud, we performed a search for subsequent consequences to the 
company, senior management, and board members using a series of key word search 
strings. Our search began with the first day of the last fiscal year in which the fraud 
occurred, and ended on the last day of the fiscal year ending two fiscal years after the 
fiscal year in which the last AAER related to the fraud was issued.  
 
We reviewed each instance where an article or press release was identified as a 
result of the application of key word search strings. We captured information about 
whether the company had experienced financial difficulty to the point of filing for 
bankruptcy, being placed in conservatorship, or liquidating. We also determined 
whether the company was delisted from a national stock exchange or a national 
securities association, or engaged in a material asset sale (including a sale of the 
company). We also captured information about the consequences of the alleged fraud 
for senior management and members of the board of directors, including resignation, 
termination, and other turnover. In addition, we captured whether members of senior 
management were criminally indicted and convicted. Finally, to examine abnormal 
stock price effects linked to public disclosures of the alleged fraud, we captured the first 
public disclosure that suggested that material accounting improprieties may have 
occurred, and the first public disclosure of an SEC or Department of Justice 
investigation.  
 
Data Limitations 
 
Readers should recognize that, despite the best efforts to collect complete data for all 
sample companies, the data sources used were often incomplete, and sometimes 
inconsistent. For example, AAERs were uneven in their level of disclosure, and other 
sources (e.g., Form 10-Ks, proxies, etc.) sometimes were not available. Additionally, the 
analysis is limited by the accuracy and completeness of information that is reported in 
these sources.  
 
 In addition to data availability issues, readers should also recognize that a great 
deal of professional judgment was necessary when collecting, categorizing, and 
synthesizing the data. Written summaries prepared from our analysis of the data 
obtained from the AAERs comprise several thousand pages of text, and the team 
incurred over 10,000 hours to gather and summarize the data underlying this study. We 
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believe that we have been reasonable and consistent in our judgments, but the research 
approach was limited by the quality of our judgments. 
 
 Finally, the authors and research managers performed a great deal of data 
review to ensure the quality of the team’s efforts. Much of the team’s work was 
subjected to layers of reperformance, review, and reasonableness testing to promote 
sound and consistent data collection and summarization. 
 
 Given the various limitations above, we encourage readers to view the results as 
sound approximations of the underlying reality. With the large number of individuals 
on the team involved, and with the need for a large amount of professional judgment 
due to the nature of the underlying data, the results of the study should be viewed as 
providing a broad profile of fraudulent financial reporting during this period rather 
than perfectly precise dollar amounts or percentages for all data points included in this 
monograph. 
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III. Detailed Analysis of Instances of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting: 1998-2007 
  
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial reporting reported by the SEC in AAERs 
issued between January 1998 and December 2007. After reading 1,759 AAERs, we 
identified 347 companies involved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting.7 In most instances, these fraud cases represent allegations of financial 
statement fraud made by the SEC without the company and/or individuals named in the 
AAER admitting guilt. 
 
This section contains the findings from our reading of (a) AAERs related to each 
of the 347 companies, (b) databases containing selected financial statement data 
reported in Form 10-Ks filed before and during the period the alleged financial 
statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged fraud period, 
and (d) databases of business press articles written about the sample companies after 
the fraud was disclosed. This section contains extensive information about each of the 
following items: 
 
 Nature of the companies involved 
 Characteristics of the alleged fraud perpetrators 
 Nature of the frauds 
 Board governance characteristics, including the nature of the audit committee and 
compensation committee  
 Issues related to the external auditor 
 Consequences to fraud companies and perpetrators subsequent to discovery 
 
 To examine whether certain board governance characteristics and whether 
certain events affecting fraud firms subsequent to the revelation of a fraud event are 
unique to fraud companies, we gathered a sample of similar no-fraud firms to examine 
whether differences exist between fraud firms and no-fraud firms. Our methodology for 
selecting and evaluating information related to no-fraud firms is described later in this 
document in the section “Board Governance Characteristics.” 
  
                                                 
7 Generally there were multiple Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) related to the 
fraud at a single company. 
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NATURE OF COMPANIES INVOLVED 
 
Financial Profile of Sample Companies 
 
We were able to obtain the last clean financial statements for 313 of the 347 sample 
companies.8 Table 1 highlights selected financial statement information for these fraud 
companies. 
 
While total assets, total revenues, and stockholder’s equity averaged $5.772 
billion, $2.557 billion, and $1.001 billion, respectively, the median of total assets was 
$93.1 million, the median of total revenues was 
$72.4 million, and the median of stockholder’s 
equity was $39.5 million in the period before 
the fraud began. Given third quartiles of total 
assets of $674 million, total revenues of $466 
million, and stockholder’s equity of $242 
million, most of the sample companies operated 
under the $500 million size range.9  
 
Fraud affected companies of all sizes. Fraud companies ranged from startups 
with no assets or revenues to companies with just under $400 billion in assets or over 
$100 billion in revenues. Similarly, stockholders’ equity ranged from negative equity of 
over $1 billion to positive equity of over $53 billion. However, the typical size of the 
fraud companies noted above is substantially larger than the fraud companies in COSO’s 
1999 study.  
 
The sample companies in the 1999 study had total assets, total revenues, and 
stockholder’s equity that averaged $533 million, $233 million, and $86 million, 
respectively. The median of total assets in the 1999 study was only $15.7 million, the 
median of total revenues was only $13 million, and the median of stockholder’s equity 
was only $5 million in the period before the fraud began. Given third quartiles of total 
assets of $74 million, total revenues of $53 million, and stockholder’s equity of $17 
million, most of the sample fraud companies in the 1999 study operated well under the 
$100 million size range, which is substantially smaller than the sample fraud companies 
from the current study, even considering the effects of inflation. 
 
                                                 
8 Our primary source of previously issued financial statements was the COMPUTSTAT® database. There 
were slight differences in availability of certain financial statement items. Thus, we were unable to locate 
each data item for all of the 313 sample companies available on COMPUTSTAT®, as shown in the last row 
of Table 1. 
9 Because some high-profile frauds involving very large companies (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, etc.) are 
included in this ten-year period, the means are inflated. Therefore, we winsorized the sample by setting 
all observations above the 95th percentile to equal the value for the observation at the 95th percentile. The 
winsorized means were $1.9 billion for total assets, $1.6 billion for revenues, $478 million for 
stockholders equity, $49 million for net income, and $84 million for cash flow from operations.  
Fraud companies’ median 
assets and revenues were 
under $100 million in the 
year preceding the first fraud 
period. 
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 Some of the sample companies were financially stressed in the period preceding 
the fraud period. The median net income was only $875,000, with the 25th percentile 
facing net losses of nearly $2.1 million. The 75th percentile had net income just over $18 
million in the year before the fraud allegedly began. Similarly, cash flow from 
operations averaged $246 million, while median cash flow from operations was only 
$317,000. This closeness to breakeven positions was consistent with what was 
observed in COSO’s 1999 study. 
 
Table 1 – Financial Profile of Sample Companies 
Last Financial Statements Prior to Beginning of Fraud Period 
 
  
 
Total Assets 
 
 
Revenues 
Stockholders’ 
Equity 
(Deficit) 
 
Net Income 
(Loss) 
Cash Flow 
From 
Operations 
 (in $000s) 
 
Mean $5,771,693 $2,557,298 $1,000,508 $140,097 $246,332 
Median $93,112 $72,360 $39,457 $875 $317 
Minimum 
value 
$0 $(23) ($1,021,747) ($2,687,000) ($1,214,000) 
1st quartile $14,806 $9,468 $4,765 ($2,136) ($2,007) 
3rd quartile $673,805 $465,870 $242,261 $18,090 $37,384 
Maximum 
value 
$391,673,000 $128,313,000 $53,206,590 $8,897,000 $16,654,000 
Companies 313 311 312 311 303 
 
National Stock Exchange Listing 
 
We reviewed the last clean financial statements and CRSP database to identify the 
national stock exchange where each company’s stock traded. We were able to identify 
the stock exchange listing for 313 of the 347 sample companies. As indicated by the pie 
chart in Table 2, most (50 percent) were traded on the NASDAQ exchange. Twenty-
three percent of the companies’ stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and four 
percent of the companies’ stock traded on the American Stock Exchange. Finally, 23 
percent of the companies’ stock traded on electronic bulletin boards, pink sheets, and 
other over-the-counter markets. 
 
According to the 2006 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public 
Companies (Advisory Committee 2006), approximately 19.5 percent of all publicly-
traded companies are registered on the New York Stock Exchange, 5.7 percent are 
registered on the American Stock Exchange, and 24.2 percent trade in the NASDAQ 
National Market or NASDAQ Capital Market. The remainder trade on the over-the-
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counter bulletin boards (22.6 percent ) or pink sheets (28.0 percent). Thus, the mix of 
fraud firms trading in NASDAQ markets (50 percent) is higher than the overall profile of 
public companies on NASDAQ (24 percent). 
 
Table 2 – Sample Companies’ National Stock Exchange Listing  
(n = 313 with Available Information) 
 
 
 
The percentage of companies (73 percent) whose stock traded on any over-the-counter 
market (NASDAQ, electronic bulletin boards, pink sheets, etc.) was in line with the 78 
percent of companies in the 1999 COSO study whose stock traded on any of the over-
the-counter markets. The percentage of companies in COSO’s 1999 study whose stock 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (15 percent) or American Stock Exchange (7 
percent) also was fairly similar to the present study.  
 
Industries for Companies Involved 
 
We reviewed the information included in the AAERs to determine the primary industry 
in which the fraud companies operated. Similar to our findings in the 1999 COSO study, 
the two most frequent industries cited were computer hardware and software (20 
percent) and other manufacturing (20 percent). Other frequently-cited industries in the 
current study were healthcare/health products (11 percent), retailers/wholesalers (9 
percent), other service providers (7 percent), and telecommunications (7 percent). See 
the pie chart in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Primary Industries of Sample Fraud Companies 
 
 
 
 
Geographic Location of Sample Companies 
 
We reviewed the AAERs to identify the geographic location of the fraud companies. 
Most of the frauds were committed at or directed from the companies’ headquarters 
locations. We were able to identify the headquarters location for 329 of the 347 fraud 
companies. Table 4 contains information about the frequency of cases for states in 
which at least 10 fraud companies were located. Similar to sample fraud companies 
examined in COSO’s 1999 study, the highest percentages of frauds involved companies 
headquartered in California and New York. In the current study, the most fraud 
companies were located in California (19 percent of the fraud cases), New York (10 
percent), Texas (7 percent), Florida (7 percent), New Jersey (5 percent), Massachusetts 
(4 percent), and Illinois (4 percent). This pattern is consistent with centers of business 
activity in the U.S.  
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Table 4 – Locations of Fraud Companies 
 (n = 329 with Available Information) 
 
 
 
 
ALLEGED FRAUD PERPETRATORS 
 
Individuals Named in the AAERs 
 
From our reading of the AAERs, we captured information about the types of company 
representatives and outsiders named in an AAER related to each instance of alleged 
fraudulent financial reporting. We captured names of all individuals listed in any of the 
AAERs related to an instance of fraudulent financial reporting, whether these 
individuals were charged with fraud or charged with other lesser violations. The SEC 
named in the AAERs individuals involved in the alleged fraud for 342 of the 347 fraud 
companies. Even though these individuals were named in an AAER, there was no 
certain evidence that all the named participants violated the antifraud statutes, and 
other individuals not named in an AAER may have been involved in the fraud. In 
addition, most of the named participants neither admitted nor denied guilt of any kind. 
 
Using the highest managerial title for an individual, we summarized the typical 
employee positions named in the AAER. For example, 
if one individual had the titles of chief financial officer 
(CFO) and controller, we reported that as involving 
strictly the CFO position in our reporting in Table 5 
below. As noted in Table 5, the senior executive most 
frequently named in an AAER was the chief executive 
The CEO and/or CFO were 
named in an AAER for 89 
percent of the fraud 
companies. 
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officer (CEO). The CEO was named as one of the parties involved in 246 of 342 fraud 
companies, representing 72 percent of the sample companies with available 
information. The second most frequently identified senior executive was the CFO. The 
CFO was named in 222 of the 342 fraud companies, which represents 65 percent of the 
companies involved. When considered together, the CEO and/or CFO were named in 
305 of the 342 (89 percent) of the cases. 
 
Table 5 – Types and Frequencies of Individuals Named in AAERs 
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Note: In many cases the AAERs cited board members for their involvement in the fraud. The vast majority of 
these individuals appeared to be company managers serving on the board, including CEOs serving as Board 
Chair. 
 
The company controller was named in 115 of the 342 frauds, representing 34 
percent of the fraud instances. The chief operating officer (COO) was named in 10 
percent of the frauds (35 of 342), and other vice presidents were named in 129 of the 
342 frauds (38 percent of the cases). Lower level personnel were named in 23 percent 
of the cases (80 of 342 fraud instances). Recall that our classification scheme tracked 
the highest named position for an individual. Thus, the noted percentages associated 
with less senior positions may be understated. In addition, because of the relatively 
small size of some of the fraud firms in this sample, some of the noted positions (e.g., 
COO) may not have been filled. Finally, SEC enforcement actions may target top 
executives more frequently than lower level employees. These factors may contribute 
to the lower percentages noted for these positions.  
  
        Types and Frequencies of Individuals 
Named AAERs 
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The frequency with which the AAERs name the CEO as being allegedly involved 
in the fraud was the same (72 percent of fraud companies) for the current study and the 
1999 COSO study. However, the frequency with which the AAERs named the CEO 
and/or CFO in the current study (89 percent) is slightly higher than in the 1999 COSO 
study (83 percent). In addition, the CFO was approximately 50 percent more likely to be 
subject to an SEC enforcement action in the current study than in the 1999 study 
(named in 65 percent of cases in the current study, versus 43 percent of cases in COSO’s  
1999 study). Finally, the frequency with which the SEC named other individuals in the 
AAERs was generally higher in the current study as compared to the 1999 COSO study.  
 
In addition to the results in Table 5, individuals named in the AAERs extended 
beyond company executives. In 81 of the 342 fraud companies (24 percent of the cases), 
outsiders were named, generally customers and vendors. The external auditor was 
named in the AAER for 78 of the 342 fraud companies (23 percent of the fraud cases 
with information about perpetrators), and members of the audit committee were 
named in 7 of the 342 fraud companies (2 percent of the cases). 
 
Alleged Motivation for the Fraud 
 
In some instances, the SEC provided discussion in the AAERs about the alleged 
motivation for the fraud. Because the SEC did not consistently describe the alleged 
motivations in each fraud instance and there were often multiple motivations for a 
single fraud, we do not provide summary statistics about the rate of particular 
motivations. However, among those noted, the most commonly cited reasons 
summarized by the SEC in the AAERs include committing the fraud to – 
 
 Meet external earnings expectations of analysts and others  
 Meet internally set financial targets or make the company look better 
 Conceal the company’s deteriorating financial condition  
 Increase the stock price  
 Bolster financial position for pending equity or debt financing 
 Increase management compensation through achievement of bonus targets and 
through enhanced stock appreciation 
 Cover up assets misappropriated for personal gain 
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NATURE OF THE FRAUDS 
 
Total Amount of the Fraud 
 
In an attempt to obtain a judgmental measure of the typical size of the financial 
statement frauds, we accumulated information from the AAERs that provided some 
indication of the amounts involved. In many cases, the AAERs did not disclose the dollar 
amounts involved. As a result, we were only able to obtain some measure of the dollar 
amounts involved for 300 of the 347 fraud companies. As reported in Table 6, the 
average fraud involved $397.68 million of cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation over the fraud period, while the median fraud involved $12.05 
million.10 The smallest fraud was $47,200, 
while the largest totaled $25.8 billion.11 The 
first and third quartiles of cumulative 
misstatements or misappropriations were 
$3.65 million and $55.95 million, 
respectively.12 The wide variance between the 
mean and median fraud amounts is due to a 
few large high-profile frauds during the 
period, such as the frauds at Enron and 
WorldCom.  
 
Table 6 – Cumulative Dollar Amount of Fraud for a Single Company 
 
 # of Sample 
Companies 
with 
Information 
 
Mean Cumulative 
Misstatement or 
Misappropriation  
 
Median Cumulative 
Misstatement or 
Misappropriation  
  (in $ millions) 
Cumulative amount of fraud 
for a single company 
300 $397.68 $12.05 
 
Minimum = $47,200; Maximum = $25.8 billion 
1st quartile = $3.65 million; 3rd quartile = $55.95 million 
 
                                                 
10 To evaluate the impact of large outliers, we winsorized the data by setting the cumulative misstatement 
or misappropriation amount for those frauds above the 95th percentile to be equal to the value for the 
95th percentile. The winsorized average was $203.7 million. 
11 For two high-profile frauds, Royal Ahold and WorldCom, the cumulative fraud amounts provided in the 
AAERs were somewhat lower than amounts we noticed in either an SEC press release or in media 
descriptions of the case. For consistency, in Table 6 we always used the amounts presented in the AAERs, 
rather than including any larger fraud amounts discussed in press releases or media stories. 
12 Ideally, we would report misstatement information in percentage rather than dollar terms. However, 
we are unable to report percentages for most companies due to the limited amount of information 
provided in the AAERs about dollar misstatements and the lack of available financial statements for all 
fraud periods (which reflect misstated values anyway) for those companies with AAERs reporting 
misstatement information.  
The average cumulative 
misstatement amount was 
$397.68 million, while the 
median cumulative 
misstatement was $12.05 
million. 
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 The size of the cumulative misstatement or misappropriation in the current 
study was substantially larger than the cumulative misstatement or misappropriation 
summarized in COSO’s 1999 study. For the sample fraud companies in the 1999 COSO 
study, the average cumulative misstatement was only $25.0 million, while the median 
cumulative misstatement was $4.1 million. The first and third quartiles of cumulative 
misstatements or misappropriations for the 1999 COSO study were $1.6 million and 
$11.76 million, respectively. 
 
For the period 1998-2007, the total cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation was nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available 
information. This large total is driven by the numerous large company frauds of the 
early 2000s, including Enron, WorldCom, and others. It is clear that the magnitude of 
the fraud cases was much greater in 1998-2007 than in 1987-1997. 
 
Unfortunately, the AAERs do not consistently report the dollar amounts involved 
in each fraud. In some instances, the AAERs report the dollar amounts of the fraud by 
noting the extent to which assets were misstated. In other cases, the AAERs report the 
amounts that revenues, net income, pre-tax income, or other items were misstated. We 
used the nature of the data presented in the AAER to develop a reasonable measure of 
the fraud amount; however, we caution the reader that a great deal of judgment was 
used. In addition, this analysis was dependent on which figures the SEC chose to 
disclose in the AAERs. Accordingly, the categories and figures below should be viewed 
as reasonable estimates of fraud amounts (i.e., not exact point estimates). Information 
about the amounts involved by fraud type is provided below in Table 7. 
 
Asset misstatements averaged $226.74 million, with a median of $7.9 million. 
The average misstatements of revenues, expenses, pre-tax income, and net income 
ranged from $91.44 million to $958.98 million, with medians ranging from $10.2 
million to $21.5 million. The average misappropriation of assets (i.e., theft of assets) 
was $16.3 million, while the median misappropriation of assets was $4.0 million. 
 
Table 7 – Dollar Amount of Misstatements by Fraud Type 
 
 
 
Misstatement Type 
# of Fraud 
Companies with 
Information 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Misstatement  
Median 
Cumulative 
Misstatement 
  (in $ millions) 
Assets 44 $226.74 $7.9 
Revenue or gain 132 $455.04 $10.3 
Expense 26 $91.44 $19.8 
Pre-tax income 20 $958.98 $21.5 
Net income 36 $525.21 $10.2 
Misappropriation of assets 15 $16.30 $4.0 
 Note: See Table 1 for the typical size of the companies involved. 
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While Tables 6 and 7 provide some information about the average and median 
cumulative effects of the fraud over the entire fraud period, Table 8 provides an 
overview of the largest income misstatement in a single period. For each of the 
companies where the related AAERs reported misstatement information as a function 
of pre-tax income or net income, we identified the largest single-year or single-quarter 
misstatement over that company’s fraud period. For the AAERs providing misstatement 
information relative to pre-tax income (information provided for 66 companies), the 
average of the largest pre-tax misstatement in a single period was $101.6 million, with a 
median single period pre-tax misstatement of $6.75 million. This was substantially 
larger than in COSO’s 1999 study, which reported an average pre-tax income 
misstatement of $7.1 million and median pre-tax income misstatement of $3.2 million. 
For AAERs reporting misstatements as a function of net income (105 companies), the 
average largest single period misstatement of net income was $90.4 million with a 
median single period net income misstatement of $5.0 million.13 This was also 
substantially larger than the average and median largest single period net income 
misstatement of $9.9 million and $2.2 million, respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999 
study.  
 
Table 8 – Largest Single Period Income Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
Description 
 
Number of Fraud 
Companies with 
Information 
Mean Largest 
Single Year or 
Quarter 
Misstatement  
Median Largest 
Single Year or 
Quarter 
Misstatement  
  (in $ millions) 
Information reported as a function 
of pre-tax income 
66 $101.6 $6.75 
 
Information reported as a function 
of net income 
 
105 
 
$90.4 
 
$5.0 
 
  
Timing of Fraud Period 
 
For the 347 instances of fraudulent financial reporting, the related fraudulently 
misstated financial statements were issued in calendar years beginning before 1990 
and extending through 2006. The years with the greatest number of misstatements 
were 1997-2001, with over 100 companies misstating their financials in each of these 
years. Due to the time lag in SEC enforcement, the vast majority of the misstated 
periods were before the passage of SOX in 2002. Only 61 of the 347 fraud companies 
examined in this study had fraudulently misstated financial statements involving 
periods subsequent to 2002. Only a small number of those involved companies subject 
to the reporting provisions of Section 404 of SOX.  
                                                 
13 The winsorized means (set equal to the 95th percentile value) were $54.3 million for pre-tax income 
and $38.0 million for net income. 
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Typical Length of Problem Period 
 
The financial statement frauds generally involved multiple fiscal periods. Information to 
determine the number of months from the beginning of the first fraud period to the end 
of the last fraud period was available for all of the 347 sample companies. Fraud 
periods extended on average for 31.4 months, with the median fraud period extending 
24 months. This was slightly longer than the average and median fraud periods of 23.7 
months and 21 months, respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999 study. Many of the frauds 
began with misstatements of interim financial 
statements that were continued in annual financial 
statement filings. Only 44 of the 347 companies (13 
percent) issued fraudulent financial statements involving 
a period of less than twelve months. The longest problem 
period was 180 months (and it was 168 months for two 
other companies). 
 
Methods of Fraudulently Reporting Financial Statement Information 
 
Based upon information included in the AAERs, we made our best attempt to identify 
the methods used to fraudulently report the financial statement information. As noted 
in Table 9, the two most common techniques used to fraudulently misstate financial 
statement information involved overstating revenues and assets. Sixty-one percent of 
the 347 fraud companies recorded revenues inappropriately, primarily by creating 
fictitious revenue transactions or by recording revenues prematurely. This was a higher 
rate of revenue misstatements than the 50 percent found in COSO’s 1999 study.  
 
Fifty-one percent of the 347 fraud 
companies overstated assets, primarily by 
overvaluing existing assets or capitalizing items 
that should have been expensed.14 Thirty-one 
percent of the 347 companies’ financial 
statements were misstated through the 
understatement of expenses or liabilities. That 
rate was higher than the 18 percent found in 
COSO’s 1999 study.  
                                                 
14 To avoid double-counting, the information about the overstatement of assets does not include 
overstatements of accounts receivable due to the revenue recognition frauds. 
The typical length of the 
fraud period was two 
years. 
Fraudulent misstatement of 
financial statements frequently 
involved the overstatement of 
revenues and assets. Intentional 
misstatement of financial 
statements was noted much 
more frequently than 
misappropriation of assets. 
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Table 9 – Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques 
 
 
 
Methods Used to Misstate Financial Statements 
Percentage of the 347 
Fraud Companies Using 
Fraud Method a 
 
Improper revenue recognition:  
 
61% 
    Recording fictitious revenues – 48%  
    Recording revenues prematurely – 35%  
    No description/“overstated” – 2%  
  
Overstatement of assets (excluding accounts receivable 
overstatements due to revenue fraud):  
51% 
    Overstating existing assets or capitalizing 
       expenses – 46% 
 
    Recording fictitious assets or assets not 
       owned – 11% 
 
  
Understatement of expenses/liabilities 31% 
  
Misappropriation of assets 14% 
  
Inappropriate disclosure (with no financial statement line 
item effects) 
1% 
  
Other miscellaneous techniques (acquisitions, joint 
ventures, netting of amounts, etc.) 
20% 
  
Disguised through use of related party transactions 18% 
  
Insider trading also cited 24% 
  
a  The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets do not sum to the 
category totals due to multiple types of fraud employed at a single company. Also, because the 
financial statement frauds at the sample companies often involved more than one fraud technique, 
the sum of the percentages reported exceeds 100 percent. 
  
 
Most of the financial statement fraud instances involved intentionally misstating 
financial statement information, with only 14 percent of the fraud cases involving 
misappropriation of company assets (i.e., theft of assets). This was consistent with 
earlier findings in COSO’s 1999 study that 12 percent of the fraud cases involved 
misappropriation of assets and in the 1987 Report of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting that 13 percent of the cases against public companies 
involved misappropriation of assets. 
 
As noted in Table 9, over 60 percent of the sample companies overstated 
revenues. The revenue misstatements were primarily due to recording revenues 
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fictitiously or prematurely by employing a variety of techniques that include the 
following: 
 
 Sham sales. To conceal the fraud, company representatives often falsified inventory 
records, shipping records, and invoices. In some cases, the company recorded sales 
for goods merely shipped to another company location. In other cases, the company 
pretended to ship goods to appear as if a sale occurred and then hid the related 
inventory, which was never shipped to customers, from company auditors. 
 
 Conditional sales. These transactions were recorded as revenues even though the 
sales involved unresolved contingencies or the terms of the sale were amended 
subsequently by side letter agreements, which often eliminated the customer’s 
obligation to keep the merchandise.  
 
 Round-tripping or recording loans as sales. Some companies recorded sales by 
shipping goods to alleged customers and then providing funds to the customers to 
pay back to the company. In other cases, companies recorded loan proceeds as 
revenues. 
 
 Bill and hold transactions. Several companies improperly recorded sales from bill 
and hold transactions that did not meet the criteria for revenue recognition. 
 
 Premature revenues before all the terms of the sale were completed. Generally 
this involved recording sales after the goods were ordered but before they were 
shipped to the customer. 
 
 Improper cutoff of sales. To increase revenues, the accounting records were held 
open beyond the balance sheet date to record sales of the subsequent accounting 
period in the current period. 
 
 Improper use of the percentage of completion method. Revenues were 
overstated by accelerating the estimated percentage of completion for projects in 
process. 
 
 Unauthorized shipments. Revenues were overstated by shipping goods never 
ordered by the customer or by shipping defective products and recording revenues 
at full, rather than discounted, prices. 
 
 Consignment sales. Revenues were recorded for consignment shipments or 
shipments of goods for customers to consider on a trial basis. 
 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 36 
We do not report percentages for each of the above types of fraudulent revenue 
schemes because the language used by the SEC to describe fraud techniques varied 
extensively, making it difficult to classify the various types in exact ways. Thus, it was 
difficult to categorize reliably the frequency of a specific revenue recognition fraud 
technique.15  
 
Also, in several instances, company representatives were able to falsify 
confirmation responses directly or indirectly by convincing third parties to alter the 
confirmation response. In other cases, company personnel created a variety of false 
documents. 
 
 Over half of the sample companies misstated the financial statement information 
by overstating assets. Table 10 highlights the typical asset accounts overstated by 
sample companies. Even excluding the effects of misstating accounts receivable due to 
the revenue recognition frauds, the two most common asset accounts misstated were 
inventory (51 cases) and accounts receivable (43 cases). Other asset accounts misstated 
included property, plant, and equipment (24 cases); cash/marketable securities (19 
cases); loans/notes receivable/mortgages (13 cases); investments (12 cases); and 
prepaid expenses (11 cases).  
  
                                                 
15 There are many rich examples of alleged revenue frauds using the methods listed above. Interested 
readers may consult the following AAERs for illustrative examples of many of these methods. These 
AAERs were haphazardly selected from numerous possible examples, and there is no intent to highlight 
any particular company or individual. Rather, these AAERs simply provide interesting insights into 
alleged revenue fraud methods.  
 AAER 1422 - www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7994.htm 
 AAER 1559 - www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17522.htm 
 AAER 2200 - www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19121.htm and related complaint at 
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19121.pdf 
 AAER 2126 - www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18935.htm and related complaint at  
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18935.pdf 
 AAER 2451 - www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8716.pdf 
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Table 10 – Number of Fraud Cases With Asset Accounts Misstated 
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BOARD GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
A large body of accounting research examines the relation between board governance 
characteristics and accounting outcomes (for example, see Cohen et al. 2004; DeZoort et 
al. 2002). To contribute to our understanding of the relation between the presence of 
fraud and board governance characteristics, we gathered information on the board of 
directors and on the audit and compensation committees from company proxy 
statements filed with the SEC. Because we were interested in the governance 
characteristics in place at the time the fraud began, we gathered governance data based 
on who was on the board and on the board committees during the first fraud year by 
examining the proxy statements filed with the SEC in the first year of the fraud. We 
were able to locate proxies for 203 of the 347 fraud companies.16 We also gathered data 
on board leadership issues disclosed by the company in the proxy statement (e.g., 
whether the same individual served as both CEO and chairman of the board, whether 
the company’s founder was on the board, etc.) and whether there were disclosures of 
related party transactions. 
 
To analyze whether certain governance characteristics were associated with a 
higher incidence of fraud, we gathered a sample of 203 no-fraud companies that is 
similar to the 203 fraud companies with available proxy information. Our goal was to 
compare the board governance characteristics of the fraud companies with similar 
companies apparently not engaging in fraud to identify whether certain board 
governance characteristics differed between fraud and no-fraud firms.  
 
For each fraud company, we selected a similar no-fraud company. First, the fraud 
and no-fraud pairs are traded on the same stock exchange. For example, if the fraud 
company was traded on NASDAQ, the no-fraud company was selected from NASDAQ to 
control for differences in governance characteristics across exchanges. Second, the 
proxy data are gathered from corresponding time periods (i.e., to control for differences 
in governance characteristics across time). Third, the industries of the fraud and no-
fraud samples are similar (based on the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) codes), so as to 
control for any variations in governance characteristics across industries.  
 
Finally, after the first three constraints, we attempted to make the size of the 
fraud and no-fraud companies as similar as possible, since larger companies are 
expected to have more advanced governance mechanisms due to their greater 
resources. Achieving similar size was the most challenging, as the other three 
constraints were already in place. If we could not identify an appropriate no-fraud firm 
whose market value of equity was within plus or minus 30 percent of the fraud firm’s 
market value, we then measured size using total assets (plus or minus 30 percent). 
Ultimately, the size of the fraud and no-fraud companies is within plus or minus 30 
percent in over 75 percent of the cases. There are no significant differences in median 
market value of equity or assets between fraud and no-fraud firms. Based on the 
                                                 
16 In some instances, the companies failed to file a proxy with the SEC. For others, the relevant proxy was 
not available in electronic databases or via purchase through outside vendors. 
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procedures described above, the samples of fraud and no-fraud companies are similar 
and provide a reasonable basis for comparison. 
 
Our sample period overlapped the widely recognized Report and 
Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999), jointly issued in 1999 by the New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. That report resulted in 
several changes in stock exchange listing requirements related to board governance 
implemented in 2000 by both the NYSE and NASDAQ. As a result, we partitioned our 
analysis of the data into two sub-periods, 1991-1999 and 2001-2004, based on the first 
fraud year for these 203 fraud companies.17 This allowed us to examine whether 
linkages between certain board governance characteristics and fraud occurrences 
continued subsequent to several changes in listing requirements related to board 
governance.  
 
The overarching insight from the analysis of differences in board characteristics 
between fraud and no-fraud firms reported in the pages that follow is the lack of 
notable statistical differences in many of the governance characteristics that have been 
the focus of regulators, exchanges, and governance experts in the last several years. 
Many board of director characteristics appear to no longer differ significantly between 
fraud and no-fraud firms. And, in some instances, the noted differences are in directions 
opposite of what might be expected. Furthermore, while some characteristics were 
found to be statistically significant, many of those differences may lack any practical 
significance (i.e., they may be too small to matter). While we report whether there are 
statistical differences between fraud and no-fraud firm governance characteristics, we 
leave the evaluation of practical significance to the reader. 
 
These collective observations raise the possibility that there are other more 
important governance characteristics or processes that affect the board’s ability to 
assess the risk of financial statement fraud and oversee the implementation of 
procedures to prevent, deter, and detect fraud.  
 
Full Board of Director Characteristics 
 
Board Size and Independence 
 
Table 11 contains information about the size and composition of the full board of 
directors. For each board characteristic in Table 11, we report the average for the fraud 
firms and the average for the similar set of no-fraud firms for the full sample and for 
                                                 
17 While we studied AAERs issued by the SEC between 1998 and 2007, the calendar years in which these 
203 frauds began were as early as 1991 and as late as 2004. In our sub-period analyses, we excluded 
frauds occurring in 2000 because the BRC Report was issued in 1999 and the stock exchanges made 
changes to their listing standards in 2000. Interestingly, though, more frauds began in 2000 (n = 38) than 
in any other year. Thus, we re-ran our analyses including the year 2000 in the post sub-period (i.e., we 
compared the 1991-1999 sub-period to the 2000-2004 sub-period as a sensitivity test). Our results were 
very similar to those reported in this monograph. 
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each of the sub-periods examined (1991-1999 and 2001-2004). We also report the 
difference in averages between the fraud and no-fraud firms and report the results of 
our statistical tests by providing the p-value results when those differences between 
fraud and no-fraud firms were statistically significant.18 We conducted tests to 
determine whether the differences between fraud and no-fraud firms were statistically 
significant for both the full sample and the two sub-periods examined. Because the 
sample sizes for each of the sub-periods examined were much smaller than the full 
sample (especially for the 2001-2004 sub-period), the lack of statistical significance in 
tests of each sub-period may be due to lack of statistical power due to the smaller 
sample sizes. Thus, there may be differences in fraud and no-fraud firms that we cannot 
statistically observe due to size limitations in each sub-sample.  
 
For all board characteristics where we report a p-value less than 0.10, the 
differences between fraud and no-fraud firms were interpreted to be statistically 
significant, consistent with most research. If no p-value is reported for a particular 
board characteristic, readers should conclude that fraud and no-fraud firms do not 
differ significantly in that board characteristic. We use this reporting technique for all 
tables where we report a statistical test of the difference between fraud and no-fraud 
firms. 
 
As shown in Table 11, the average fraud firm had 7.7 directors on the board as 
compared to 8.0 directors for no-fraud firms. This difference was not statistically 
significant.  
 
A large body of academic research finds that board and audit committee 
independence affects the effectiveness of board and audit committee oversight. We 
examined the relation between board independence and fraud. In analyzing board 
member independence, the following definitions were used to categorize individual 
members of the board of directors into one of three categories: 
 
 Inside director – A director who was also an officer or employee of the 
company or a subsidiary or an officer of an affiliated company. 
 
 Grey director – A director who was a former officer or employee of the 
company, a subsidiary, or an affiliate; relative of management; professional 
advisor to the company; officer or owner of a significant supplier or 
customer of the company; interlocking director; officer or employee of 
another company controlled by the CEO or the company’s majority owner; 
owner of an affiliate company; or creditor of the company. 
 
 Outside director – A director who had no disclosed relationship (other than 
stock ownership) between the director and the company or its officers. 
                                                 
18 We tested whether there was a statistical difference between the fraud sample and the no-fraud 
sample for each variable. We report p-values for those differences that were statistically significant at 
below the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
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The average percentage of inside directors on the board for fraud firms was 30 
percent as compared to 25 percent for no-fraud firms. This difference was statistically 
significant (p–value = 0.010). There was no significant difference in the percentage of  
outside directors for fraud firms (60 percent of the board) versus no-fraud firms (63 
percent of the board).  
 
There was no statistical difference between the two groups in the average 
percentage of grey directors. We were able to analyze the types of grey directors 
serving on the board of directors for 63 fraud and 63 no-fraud firms. The most common 
types of grey directors were former company 
officers, consultants, and outside legal counsel. 
Differences in types of grey directors serving on 
fraud and no-fraud firms were not statistically 
significant, except for the difference in the 
percentage of grey directors who were relatives 
of management. Seven percent of fraud firm grey 
directors were relatives of management as 
compared to 18 percent for no-fraud firms (p-
value = 0.086). 
 
When board independence was examined for the two sub-periods (1991-1999 
and 2001-2004), we found that the results for the 1991-1999 sub-period were 
generally consistent with the full sample results. That is, fraud firms had statistically 
more inside directors than no-fraud firms for 1991-1999 (p-value = 0.069). We also 
found that fraud firms were significantly more likely to have consultants as grey 
directors (32 percent) than were no-fraud firms (14 percent) (p-value = 0.034). 
However, the types of directors serving on boards in 2001-2004 were not statistically 
different for fraud and no-fraud firms. Thus, differences in board composition following 
the year 2000 may no longer be associated with the occurrence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.  
 
We found a decrease in the percentage of inside and grey directors on boards 
between the two sub-periods for both fraud and no-fraud firms. For 1991-1999, 32 
percent of the fraud firm boards were composed of inside directors as compared to only 
25 percent of the fraud firm boards in 2001-2004. Consistent with that trend, the 
percentage of outside directors on fraud firm boards increased from 56 percent in the 
1991-1999 sub-period to 67 percent in the 2001-2004 sub-period. This was consistent 
with a general shift in governance expectations over time that boards should have a 
greater percentage of outside directors.19 
 
                                                 
19 We occasionally highlight shifts in overall trends by comparing findings from the 1991-1999 sub-
period and findings from the 2001-2004 sub-period to provide insights about apparent changes in trends 
over time. However, we have not performed formal statistical tests of noted differences between the two 
sub-periods.  
While fraud firms had significantly 
more inside directors than no-fraud 
firms in the 1991-1999 sub-period, 
this difference did not continue in 
the 2001-2004 sub-period.  
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Table 11 – Board of Director Composition (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Number of board 
members 
203 7.7 8.0 -0.2   113 7.4 7.8 -0.4   52 7.9 8.0 -0.1  
                   
Type of board member:                  
 Inside director 203 30% 25% 5% 0.010  113 32% 28% 4% 0.069  52 25% 23% 2%  
 Grey director 203 10% 12% -2%   113 12% 13% -1%   52 8% 11% -3%  
 Outside director 203 60% 63% -3%   113 56% 59% -3%   52 67% 66% 1%  
Type of grey directors:                  
 Former company  
officer 
63 45% 57% -12%   41 38% 52% -14%   13 62% 54% 8%  
 Relative of 
management 
63 7% 18% -11% 0.086  41 9% 21% -12%   13 4% 15% -11%  
 Consultant to 
company 
63 25% 16% 9%   41 32% 14% 18% 0.034  13 8% 8% 0%  
 Outside legal counsel 63 15% 10% 5%   41 15% 10% 5%   13 19% 15% 4%  
 Interlocking director 63 4% 4% 0%   41 5% 6% -1%   13 4% 0% 4%  
 Banker 63 0% 0% 0%   41 0% 0% 0%   13 0% 0% 0%  
 Non-bank creditor 63 0% 0% 0%   41 0% 0% 0%   13 0% 0% 0%  
 Officer of significant 
supplier or customer 
63 2% 0% 2%   41 2% 0% 2%   13 4% 0% 4%  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Board Member Age, Tenure, and Expertise 
 
We also gathered data about specific characteristics of individuals who served on the 
boards of the fraud and no-fraud firms. Results are reported in Table 12. The age of the 
average board member was approximately the same for the fraud and no-fraud firms 
(53.9 and 54.3 years of age, respectively).  
 
Board members of fraud firms had served on the fraud company’s board for 6.7 
years on average before the first year of the fraud, which was statistically lower than 
the average of 7.7 years that directors of no-fraud firms served (p-value = 0.010). Thus, 
individuals serving on the boards of fraud firms had fewer years of experience on that 
board relative to individuals serving on no-fraud 
firm boards.  
  
 Surprisingly, on average, 11 percent of 
fraud firms’ board members had accounting or 
finance expertise as compared to 9 percent for the 
no-fraud firms, a difference that was statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.052). More than half of the 
firms in both the fraud and no-fraud groups had at least one accounting or financial 
expert on the board (57 percent and 51 percent, respectively; these were not 
statistically different).  
 
We also examined each board member’s director experience by measuring how 
many other directorships were held by each individual director. The average board 
member served on one other corporate board (1.1 other directorships for individuals 
serving on fraud firm boards, 0.9 other directorships for no-fraud firms). Also, only 16 
percent of fraud firms and 15 percent of no-fraud firms had boards where not one 
director served on any other corporate board. The difference between fraud and no-
fraud firms was not statistically significant. 
 
 The results in the two sub-periods (1991-1999 and 2001-2004) were generally 
consistent with those reported above. Differences in director tenure were only 
statistically significant for the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.029). The length of 
board tenure was not statistically different between fraud and no-fraud firms for 2001-
2004. Also, the average percentage of directors with accounting or finance expertise 
was higher for fraud firms (12 percent of the fraud firm board) than for no-fraud firms 
(8 percent of the no-fraud firm board) in the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.017). 
 
The percentage of boards with at least one director with accounting or financial 
expertise was greater in the latter period, for both fraud and no-fraud firms. Also, the 
chance that a board would have no members who sit on the board of another firm was 
lower in the 2001-2004 sub-period, for both fraud and no-fraud firms.  
 
While the average tenure of fraud 
firm directors was significantly 
lower than for no-fraud firms, 
there may be little practical 
significance in this difference. 
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Table 12 – Individual Director Characteristics (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Director age 203 53.9 54.3 -0.4   113 54.2 53.6 0.6   52 53.6 55.3 -1.7  
                   
Director tenure on board 
(in years) 
203 6.7 7.7 -1.0 0.010  113 6.7 7.8 -1.1 0.029  52 6.9 8.0 -1.1  
                   
Percentage of board 
members with accounting 
or finance expertise 
203 11% 9% 2% 0.052  113 12% 8% 4% 0.017  52 13% 11% 2%  
                   
Percentage of companies 
with at least one 
accounting or financial 
expert on board 
203 57% 51% 6%   113 56% 47% 9%   52 67% 60% 7%  
                   
Average number of other 
directorships held by 
board members 
203 1.1 0.9 0.2   113 1.0 0.9 0.1   52 1.1 0.9 0.2  
                   
Percentage of companies 
where not one member of 
the board held any other 
directorships 
203 16% 15% 1%   113 19% 22% -3%   52 13% 10% 3%  
                   
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Stock Ownership 
 
We obtained data about the extent of company stock owned by directors and officers of 
the company. Stock ownership information was available for 196 of the 203 pairs of 
fraud and no-fraud firms. This information is reported in Table 13. Directors and 
officers owned a significant percentage of the stock of both the fraud and no-fraud firms 
(23 percent and 22 percent of outstanding common shares, respectively). On average, 
the highest-ranking officer owned 9 percent of the 
stock for both groups, and the largest stockholder 
among the officers and directors owned 15 percent 
of the stock for fraud firms as compared to 13 
percent for no-fraud firms. None of the differences 
was statistically significant. The results for the two 
sub-periods are consistent with the full sample 
results.  
 
Board Chair and CEO Age and Tenure 
 
We gathered data about certain characteristics of the individuals serving as board chair 
and as CEO. The results are reported in Table 13. We collected data about the type of 
director serving as the chairman of the board for 182 of the 203 pairs of fraud and no-
fraud firms. The chairman of the board was an inside director in over 70 percent of both 
fraud and no-fraud firms (75 percent of fraud firms and 70 percent of no-fraud firms 
had an inside director as chairman). This likely reflects the prevalence in the U.S. of 
assigning both the position of CEO and board chair to the same individual. Interestingly, 
the percentage of firms whose chairman of the board was a grey director was 11 
percent for fraud firms as compared to 19 percent for no-fraud firms, a difference that 
is statistically significant (p-value = 0.039). That result was also statistically significant 
for the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.046). 
 
We found that, on average, the CEO was approximately 51 years old for both 
fraud and no-fraud firms. CEO tenure, which reflects the number of years the individual 
had served as CEO of the firm, was approximately 10 years for both fraud and no-fraud 
firms (9.4 years for fraud firms, 10.2 years for no-fraud firms). These results were not 
statistically different for the full sample. However, the average age of CEOs in the 2001-
2004 sub-period was 49.9 years old for fraud firms as compared to 53.2 years old for 
no-fraud firms. The difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.051). Similarly, 
the average CEO tenure was statistically lower for fraud firms relative to no-fraud firms 
for the 2001-2004 sub-period (p-value = 0.098).  
  
 
There was no difference in stock 
ownership held by officers and 
directors between fraud and no-
fraud firms. 
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Table 13 – Stock Ownership by Directors and Officers; Board Chair and CEO Traits (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Stock owned by directors 
and officers 
 
196 23% 22% 1%   107 24% 23% 1%   52 18% 21% -3%  
Stock owned by the 
highest-ranking officer 
 
196 9% 9% 0%   107 11% 10% 1%   52 7% 7% 0%  
Stock owned by the 
largest holder among 
officers and directors 
 
196 15% 13% 2%   107 17% 14% 3%   52 12% 13% -1%  
Type of board chair:                  
 Inside director 182 75% 70% 5%   99 80% 76% 4%   48 64% 56% 8%  
 Grey director 182 11% 19% -8% 0.039  99 7% 16% -9% 0.046  48 17% 25% -8%  
 Outside director 
 
182 14% 11% 3%   99 13% 8% 5%   48 19% 19% 0%  
CEO age (in years) 203 50.7 51.4 -0.7   113 51.7 50.6 1.1   52 49.9 53.2 -3.3 0.051 
CEO tenure (in years) 203 9.4 10.2 -0.8   113 10.1 10.2 -0.1   52 8.3 11.1 -2.8 0.098 
                   
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed). 
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Number of Board Meetings Per Year 
 
We gathered data about the number of board meetings held during the year. That 
information is reported in Table 14. Perhaps surprisingly, boards of fraud firms met 
significantly more often (7.7 meetings per year) than boards of no-fraud firms (6.6 
meetings per year) (p-value = 0.001). 
There was no difference between fraud 
and no-fraud firms in the average number 
of board meetings for the 1991-1999 sub-
period, but fraud firms had statistically 
more board meetings than no-fraud firms 
for the 2001-2004 sub-period (p-value = 
0.005). These differences may reflect the 
fact that fraud firms often experienced 
financial stress, perhaps precipitating 
additional board meetings.  
 
Director Turnover 
 
As shown in Table 14, the number of directors who left the board during the first fraud 
year was generally quite small (an average of 0.2 directors left fraud firm boards as 
compared to an average of 0.4 directors leaving no-fraud boards), but this difference 
was statistically significant (p-value = 0.045). Fifteen percent of fraud firms had a 
director leave the board during the first fraud year, while 25 percent of the no-fraud 
firms had a director leave the board during the comparable year, and this difference 
was statistically significant (p-value = 
0.018). Thus, during the first fraud year, 
director turnover was lower for fraud firms 
than for no-fraud firms. 
 
 There was no difference between 
fraud and no-fraud firms in the number of 
directors who left the board during the first fraud year in either of the two sub-periods. 
However, during the 1991-1999 sub-period, 13 percent of fraud and 23 percent of no-
fraud firms had a director leave the board during the first fraud year, a difference that 
was statistically significant (p-value = 0.058). During the 2001-2004 sub-period, the 
same percentage (25 percent) of fraud and no-fraud firms had a director leave the 
board during the first fraud year. 
 
Blockholders 
 
Often an individual or entity owns a significant portion of a company’s common shares. 
These are generally referred to as “blockholders.” Consistent with corporate 
governance literature, we defined an outside blockholder as an individual or an entity 
that owned five percent or more of the firm’s stock. We gathered data about the extent 
of blockholder ownership, which also is reported in Table 14.  
During the first fraud year, director 
turnover was lower for fraud firms 
than for no-fraud firms. 
Boards of fraud firms met 
significantly more often than boards 
of no-fraud firms. This difference may 
reflect the fact that fraud firms often 
experienced financial stress preceding 
the fraud period, which precipitated 
additional board meetings. 
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We found that approximately two-thirds of both fraud and no-fraud firms had an 
outside blockholder who was not a director (67 percent of fraud firms and 74 percent 
of no-fraud firms). Also, 23 percent of fraud and 24 percent of no-fraud firms had an 
outside blockholder who was a director. 
 
 During the 1991-1999 sub-period, fraud companies were significantly less likely 
to have an outside blockholder who was not a director. Fifty-eight percent of fraud 
firms had a blockholder who was not a director, while 75 percent of no-fraud firms had 
a blockholder who was not a director. That difference was statistically significant (p-
value = 0.009). That difference did not continue for the 2001-2004 sub-period. 
 
Internal Audit 
 
Requirements to disclose the existence of an internal audit function did not exist for the 
entire period of the study. We identified disclosures (some may have been voluntary) of 
an internal audit function for approximately 30 percent of both the fraud and no-fraud 
firms during the full sample time period. Disclosure of an internal audit group was 
much more likely in the 2001-2004 sub-period than in the 1991-1999 sub-period for 
both fraud and no-fraud firms. Less than 20 percent of firms voluntarily disclosed 
having an internal audit function in the 1991-1999 sub-period, while about 50 percent 
of firms disclosed having an internal audit function in the 2001-2004 sub-period. 
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Table 14 – Other Full Board and Governance Characteristics (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
  
#
 o
f 
 P
a
ir
s 
o
f 
F
ir
m
s 
F
ra
u
d
 S
a
m
p
le
 
N
o
-F
ra
u
d
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
F
ra
u
d
 ―
  
N
o
-F
ra
u
d
 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
 #
 o
f 
 P
a
ir
s 
o
f 
F
ir
m
s 
F
ra
u
d
 S
a
m
p
le
 
N
o
-F
ra
u
d
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
F
ra
u
d
 ―
  
N
o
-F
ra
u
d
 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
 #
 o
f 
 P
a
ir
s 
o
f 
F
ir
m
s 
F
ra
u
d
 S
a
m
p
le
 
N
o
-F
ra
u
d
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
F
ra
u
d
 ―
  
N
o
-F
ra
u
d
 
p
-v
a
lu
e
 
                  
Number of board 
meetings per year 
183 7.7 6.6 1.1 0.001  99 7.6 6.6 1.0   49 8.0 6.2 1.8 0.005 
                   
Number of directors who 
left the board during the 
first fraud year 
203 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.045  113 0.2 0.4 -0.2   52 0.4 0.3 0.1  
                   
Percentage of companies 
that had a director leave 
during the first fraud 
year 
203 15% 25% -10% 0.018  113 13% 23% -10% 0.058  52 25% 25% 0%  
                   
Percentage of companies 
with an outside 
blockholder who was not 
a director 
196 67% 74% -7%   107 58% 75% -17% 0.009  52 77% 77% 0%  
                   
Percentage of companies 
with an outside 
blockholder who was a 
director 
196 23% 24% -1%   107 21% 19% 2%   52 21% 29% -8%  
                   
Percentage of companies 
disclosing existence of an 
internal audit function 
203 32% 29% 3%   113 19% 18% 1%   52 50% 48% 2%  
                   
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
Audit committees are generally responsible for the board’s oversight of the financial 
reporting process. We gathered extensive information about selected audit committee 
characteristics. Among the set of 203 pairs of fraud and no-fraud firms, 193 fraud firms 
had an audit committee and 199 no-fraud firms had an audit committee. So that we 
could continue to have a set of fraud companies similarly paired with no-fraud 
companies, we reduced the size of the sample for our analysis of audit committee 
characteristics to 188 pairs of fraud and no-fraud firms that both had audit committees. 
This same reasoning applies to the other variables where the sample size was less than 
203. 
 
Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency 
 
As reported in Table 15, 95 percent of fraud firms maintained an audit committee while 
98 percent of no-fraud firms maintained an audit committee (the difference was 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.066)). The average size of audit committees for both 
fraud and no-fraud firms was about three members. Consistent with the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (BRC) Report recommendation that audit committees have at least three 
members (a recommendation subsequently adopted by the stock exchanges) 70 
percent of the fraud firms and 79 percent of no-fraud firms maintained an audit 
committee with at least three members. The difference was statistically significant (p-
value = 0.044).  
 
On average, the audit committees of fraud firms had more inside directors (5 
percent of the audit committee membership) than the audit committees of no-fraud 
firms (2 percent), and that difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.008). 
Likewise, 87 percent of fraud firms had no insiders on the audit committee, versus 94 
percent of no-fraud firms. This difference was significant (p-value = 0.014). Sixty-four 
percent of the fraud firms and 67 percent of no-fraud firms maintained an audit 
committee that was composed entirely (100 percent 
of the audit committee membership) of outside, 
independent directors. This difference was not 
statistically significant. 
 
 In both sub-periods, there were no differences 
between fraud and no-fraud firms in audit committee 
existence or average audit committee size. Only in the 1991-1999 sub-period, the 
percentage of fraud firms with an audit committee composed of at least three members 
was significantly lower than for no-fraud firms (p-value = 0.050).  
 
Relating to audit committee independence, the only statistically significant 
difference between fraud and no-fraud firms in the sub-periods was that fraud firms 
had more inside directors than no-fraud firms, but this result only held for the 1991-
1999 sub-period (8 percent and 3 percent, respectively (p-value = 0.037)). Likewise, 
Few differences existed 
between audit committees of 
fraud firms and no-fraud 
firms. 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 51 
no-fraud firms in the 1991-1999 sub-period were more likely to have no insiders on the 
audit committee (p-value = 0.048). Audit committees were more independent in the 
2001-2004 sub-period than in the 1991-1999 sub-period for both fraud and no-fraud 
firms.  
 
Finally, the average number of audit committee meetings per year was 3.5 for 
fraud firms and 3.7 for no-fraud firms, and about half of all audit committees met four 
or more times per year. There were no significant differences between fraud and no-
fraud firms in the full sample or in either sub-period. 
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Table 15 – Audit Committee Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Existence of an audit committee 203 95% 98% -3% 0.066  113 92% 96% -4%   52 98% 100% -2%  
                   
Number of individuals on audit 
committee 
188 3.1 3.2 -0.1   100 3.0 3.2 -0.2   51 3.4 3.4 0  
                   
Percentage of companies with an 
audit committee composed of at 
least three members 
 
188 70% 79% -9% 0.044  100 61% 74% -13% 0.050  51 92% 92% 0%  
Type of audit committee 
member: 
                 
 Inside director 188 5% 2% 3% 0.008  100 8% 3% 5% 0.037  51 3% 1% 2%  
 Grey director 188 11% 11% 0%   100 13% 15% -2%   51 8% 7% 1%  
 Outside director 
 
188 84% 87% -3%   100 79% 82% -3%   51 89% 92% -3%  
Percentage of companies with an 
audit committee consisting of no 
inside directors 
188 87% 94% -7% 0.014  100 80% 90% -10% 0.048  51 96% 98% -2%  
                   
Percentage of companies whose 
audit committee consisted 
entirely of outside directors 
188 64% 67% -3%   100 53% 56% -3%   51 76% 78% -2%  
                   
Number of audit committee 
meetings per year 
 
170 3.5 3.7 -0.2   93 2.6 2.9 -0.3   47 5.1 4.9 0.2  
Percentage of companies where 
audit committee met at least 
four times per year 
170 45% 51% -6%   93 23% 31% -8%   47 81% 85% -4%  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed). 
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Financial expertise and governance expertise 
 
We also gathered data about the expertise of individuals who served on the audit 
committee. A board member was coded as having accounting or finance expertise if he 
or she had current or prior experience as a CFO, CPA, controller, or vice president of 
finance. Results are provided in Table 16. On average, 14 percent of audit committee 
members for fraud and 10 percent for no-fraud firms had accounting or finance 
expertise. That difference was statistically significant for the full sample (p-value = 
0.053) for the 1991-1999 sub-period (p-value = 0.006). Similarly, in the 1991-1999 
sub-period, 33 percent of the fraud firms 
and only 20 percent of no-fraud firms 
had at least one audit committee 
member with accounting or finance 
expertise, a significant difference (p-
value = 0.037). Both fraud and no-fraud 
firms were more likely to have at least 
one financial expert on the audit 
committee in more recent years. 
 
Because experience serving as a director might impact an individual’s 
effectiveness as a board member, we collected data about the average number of 
director positions held on other company boards (other than the relevant fraud or no-
fraud firms) by audit committee members. We found that average was similar for fraud 
and no-fraud firms (1.2 and 1.1 other directorships held by audit committee members 
for fraud and no-fraud firms, respectively).  
 
Audit Committee Chair, Charter, and Committee Appointment Process 
 
The overwhelming majority of audit committee chairs were outside directors (93 
percent for fraud and 91 percent for no-fraud firms, respectively; difference not 
statistically significant).20 Overall, relatively few audit committee chairs had accounting 
or finance expertise, with no significant difference between fraud and no-fraud firms. 
However, for the 1991-1999 sub-period, 18 percent of the audit committee chairs of 
fraud firms and zero percent of audit committee chairs of no-fraud firms had 
accounting or finance expertise; this difference was statistically significant (p-value = 
0.070).  
 
Thirty-two percent of the fraud and 35 percent of no-fraud firms in the full 
sample included the audit committee report or charter in the proxy statement 
(difference not statistically significant). Only three percent of fraud firms and one 
percent of no-fraud firms included an audit committee report or charter in the proxy 
during 1991-1999. However, during the 2001-2004 sub-period, 81 percent of fraud 
firms and 94 percent of no-fraud firms included an audit committee report or charter in 
                                                 
20 Only 43 pairs of firms disclosed the name of the chair of the audit committee. Given the small sample 
size, results related to the audit committee chair should be interpreted with caution. 
Surprisingly, the percentage of 
individuals on audit committees with 
finance or accounting expertise was 
significantly higher for fraud firms than 
no-fraud firms for the full sample and 
the 1991-1999 sub-period. 
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the proxy statement. The difference during the 
2001-2004 period between fraud and no-fraud 
firms was statistically different (p-value = 0.038). 
Charters became much more common in proxy 
statements as a result of a BRC Report 
recommendation that was adopted by the stock 
exchanges. 
  
We also gathered data on whether audit committee members, including the 
committee chair, joined the board after the current CEO (at the time the fraud began) 
was appointed. To the extent that a greater percentage of committee members joined 
the board after the current CEO was appointed, the current CEO may have played a 
greater role in their appointment and, as a result, may have had greater influence over 
the respective board committee. For both fraud and no-fraud firms, at least two-thirds 
of audit committee members and chairs were appointed after the current CEO assumed 
his or her position, with differences not statistically different in the full sample or either 
sub-period.  
In the 2001-2004 sub-period, 
fraud firms were less likely than 
no-fraud firms to include an 
audit committee charter or 
report in the proxy. 
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Table 16 – Other Audit Committee Characteristics (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Percentage of audit committee 
members with accounting or 
finance expertise 
 
188 14% 10% 4%  0.053  100 15% 7% 8%  0.006  51 16% 16% 0%   
Percentage of audit committees 
with at least one accounting or 
finance expert 
 
188 34% 28% 6%    100 33% 20% 13%  0.037  51 43% 43% 0%   
Average number of director 
positions held by audit 
committee members on other 
company boards 
 
188 1.2 1.1 0.1    100 1.2 1.0 0.2    51 1.2 1.0 0.2   
Type of audit committee chair:                     
 Inside director 43 2% 0% 2%    17 6% 0% 6%    16 0% 0% 0%   
 Grey director 43 5% 9% -4%    17 6% 6% 0%    16 6% 19% -13%   
 Outside director 43 93% 91% 2%    17 88% 94% -6%    16 94% 81% 13% 
 
  
Percentage of audit committees 
whose chair had accounting or 
finance expertise 
 
43 21% 14% 7%    17 18% 0% 18%  0.070  16 19% 31% -12%   
Percentage of companies that 
included audit committee report 
or charter in proxy 
 
203 32% 35% -3%    113 3% 1% 2%    52 81% 94% -13%  0.038 
Percentage of audit committee 
members who joined audit 
committee after CEO appointed 
 
188 77% 75% 2%    100 81% 73% 8%    51 73% 75% -2%   
Percent of audit committees 
whose chair joined board after 
CEO appointed 
43 67% 67% 0%    17 59% 59% 0%    16 81% 88% -7%   
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Compensation Committee Characteristics 
 
We gathered information about several characteristics of the companies’ compensation 
committees. The analysis of this information is provided in the sections that follow. We 
analyzed compensation committees because compensation, especially executive 
compensation, can affect management’s motivation to commit fraud. 
 
Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency 
 
As reported in Table 17, fraud firms were significantly less likely to have maintained a 
compensation committee than no-fraud firms. While 88 percent of fraud firms 
maintained a compensation committee, 94 percent of no-fraud firms maintained a 
compensation committee. That difference was significant (p-value = 0.058). The 
average compensation committee size 
was 3.1 members for fraud firms and 
3.2 members for no-fraud firms. Sixty-
nine percent of the fraud and 75 
percent of no-fraud firms maintained a 
compensation committee with at least 
three members. These differences were 
not statistically significant.  
 
As for the composition of compensation committees, 85 percent of fraud firm 
compensation committee membership and 88 percent of no-fraud firm compensation 
committee membership consisted of outside directors. This difference was not 
statistically significant. Eighty-nine percent of the fraud firms and 90 percent of no-
fraud firms had a compensation committee with no insiders; this difference was not 
statistically significant. Also, 66 percent of the fraud and 70 percent of no-fraud firms 
maintained a compensation committee that was composed entirely of outside, 
independent directors. This difference was not statistically significant. 
 
The average number of compensation committee meetings per year was 3.3 for 
fraud firms and 3.2 for no-fraud firms. Also, 73 percent of fraud firm compensation 
committees and 74 percent of no-fraud firm compensation committees met at least two 
times per year. Neither difference was significant. 
 
 While for the full sample, fraud firms were less likely to have had a 
compensation committee, this difference between fraud and no-fraud firms for each of 
the two sub-periods was not statistically significant. In both sub-periods, there were no 
other significant differences between fraud and no-fraud firms with respect to 
compensation committee characteristics in Table 17. Finally, unlike the case for audit 
committees, there was no notable improvement in compensation committee 
independence across the two sub-periods. 
 
 
A large majority of both fraud and no-
fraud firms had compensation committees, 
and there were relatively few differences 
in the characteristics of those committees 
between fraud and no-fraud firms. 
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Table 17 – Compensation Committee Existence, Size, Independence, and Meeting Frequency (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Existence of a compensation 
committee 
203 88% 94% -6% 0.058  113 84% 90% -6%   52 94% 98% -4%  
                   
Number of individuals on 
compensation committee 
170 3.1 3.2 -0.1   88 3.0 3.1 -0.1   48 3.3 3.1 0.2  
                   
Percentage of companies with a 
compensation committee composed of 
at least three members 
 
170 69% 75% -6%   88 69% 76% -7%   48 77% 67% 10%  
Type of compensation committee 
member: 
                 
 Inside director 170 4% 3% 1%   88 4% 4% 0%   48 6% 3% 3%  
 Grey director 170 11% 9% 2%   88 12% 10% 2%   48 8% 8% 0%  
 Outside director 170 85% 88% -3%   88 84% 86% -2%   48 86% 89% -3% 
 
 
Percentage of companies with a 
compensation committee consisting of 
no inside directors 
170 89% 90% -1%   88 90% 88% 2%   48 85% 92% -7%  
                   
Percentage of companies with 
compensation committee consisted 
entirely of outside directors 
170 66% 70% -4%   88 64% 69% -5%   48 71% 69% 2%  
                   
Number of compensation committee 
meetings per year 
 
153 3.3 3.2 0.1   80 3.1 3.0 0.1   46 3.5 3.4 0.1  
Percentage of companies where 
compensation committee met at least 
two times per year 
 
153 73% 74% -1%   80 70% 74% -4%   46 78% 70% 8%  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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Financial Expertise and Governance Expertise  
 
Because components of executive compensation are sometimes based on financial 
statement outcome measures (e.g., bonus based on earnings), we examined the extent 
to which compensation committees are composed of individuals with accounting or 
finance expertise. Table 18 reports that, on average, nine percent of compensation 
committee members for fraud firms and five percent of no-fraud firms’ compensation 
committee members had accounting or finance expertise. Also, 22 percent of the fraud 
firms and 14 percent of no-fraud firms had at least one member with accounting or 
finance expertise on the compensation committee. Both differences were statistically 
significant (p-values = 0.012 and 0.034, respectively). The average number of other 
director positions held by compensation committee members was similar for fraud and 
no-fraud firms (1.3 and 1.2, respectively).   
 
 Similar to the full sample results, the 
percentage (10 percent) of compensation 
committee members having accounting or 
finance expertise was statistically higher for 
fraud firms (p-value = 0.018) than the 
percentage (4 percent) for no-fraud firms in 
the 1991-1999 sub-period. Similarly, in the 
1991-1999 sub-period, 23 percent of fraud 
firms had at least one accounting or finance 
expert on the compensation committee, versus 
11 percent of no-fraud firms (p = 0.045). The 
differences between the fraud and no-fraud firms in the 2001-2004 sub-period related 
to accounting and finance expertise on the compensation committee were not 
significant. There was no statistically significant difference between the fraud and the 
no-fraud firms in the average number of other directorships held by compensation 
committee members in either sub-period.  
 
Compensation Committee Chair and Committee Appointment Process 
 
The overwhelming majority of compensation committee chairs were outside directors 
(89 percent for fraud and 97 percent for no-fraud firms; not statistically significant).21 
Virtually none of the compensation committee chairs had accounting or finance 
expertise. This finding is interesting given the accounting and financial implications of 
firm compensation practices and the associated fraud risk that certain compensation 
practices may entail. 
 
Seventy-five percent of the fraud firm compensation committee members joined 
the board after the CEO was appointed as compared to 70 percent for no-fraud firms. 
                                                 
21 Only 38 pairs of firms disclosed the name of the chair of the compensation committee. Given the small 
sample size, results related to the compensation committee chair should be interpreted with caution. 
Surprisingly, the percentage of 
individuals on compensation 
committees with finance or 
accounting expertise was 
significantly higher for fraud firms 
than no-fraud firms for the full 
sample and the 1991-1999 sub-
period. 
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That difference was not statistically significant. There also was no statistical difference 
between fraud and no-fraud firms in whether the compensation committee chair joined 
the board after the CEO assumed his or her position.  
 
 There was no statistically significant difference between the fraud and no-fraud 
firms, in either sub-period, in the percentage of outside directors serving as chair of the 
compensation committee or in the percentage of committee chairs with accounting or 
finance expertise. Compensation committee members of fraud firms were significantly 
more likely than no-fraud firms to have joined the board after the CEO assumed his or 
her position in the 1991-1999 sub-period (80 percent for fraud firms compared to 67 
percent for no-fraud firms (p-value = 0.031)). This result did not continue in the 2001-
2004 sub-period. There was no difference, in either sub-period, between fraud and no-
fraud firms as it relates to the compensation committee chair joining after the CEO was 
appointed. 
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Table 18 – Other Compensation Committee Characteristics (Means) 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Percentage of compensation 
committee members with 
accounting or finance expertise 
 
170 9% 5% 4% 0.012  88 10% 4% 6% 0.018  48 10% 6% 4%  
Percentage of compensation 
committees with at least one 
accounting or finance expert 
 
170 22% 14% 8% 0.034  88 23% 11% 12% 0.045  48 27% 15% 12%  
Average number of director 
positions held by compensation 
committee members on other 
company boards 
 
170 1.3 1.2 0.1   88 1.3 1.3 0.0   48 1.3 1.0 0.3  
Type of compensation 
committee chair: 
                 
 Inside director 38 3% 0% 3%   15 0% 0% 0%   13 8% 0% 8%  
 Grey director 38 8% 3% 5%   15 13% 0% 13%   13 0% 8% -8%  
 Outside director 
 
38 89% 97% -8%   15 87% 100% -13%   13 92% 92% 0%  
Percentage of compensation 
committees whose chair had 
accounting or finance expertise 
38 0% 3% -3%   15 0% 0% 0%   13 0% 8% -8%  
                   
Percentage of compensation 
committee members who joined 
compensation committee after 
CEO appointed 
 
170 75% 70% 5%   88 80% 67% 13% 0.031  48 67% 70% -3%  
Percentage of compensation 
committees whose chair joined 
board after CEO appointed 
38 61% 68% -7%   15 67% 53% 14%   13 62% 77% -15%  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed). 
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Board Leadership Issues and Related Party Transactions 
 
Board Leadership Issues, Appointment Process, and Personal Relationships22 
 
As reported in Table 19, and consistent with the general practice in the U.S., the CEO also 
served as chairman of the board in more than two-thirds of both fraud and no-fraud firms. 
There was no statistically significant difference between fraud and no-fraud firms. We also 
examined the role of the company’s founder in the firm’s governance process. The CEO was 
also the company’s founder for 27 percent of fraud firms as compared to 22 percent for no-
fraud firms; however, that difference was not statistically significant.  
 
The founder was on the board of directors for 42 percent of the fraud firms as 
compared to 36 percent for no-fraud firms, but the difference was not statistically 
significant. Approximately 80 percent of directors joined the board after the CEO assumed 
his or her position, and there was no statistically significant difference between the fraud 
and no-fraud firms. Finally, family relationships among non-employee directors and 
company officers existed for 6 percent of the fraud companies as compared to 13 percent 
for the no-fraud companies. That difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.012) 
for the full sample and for the 2001-2004 sub-period (p-value = 0.008).  
 
                                                 
22 We attempted to gather data on nominating committee characteristics as well. However, we only had 28 
pairs of observations with nominating committee data. Given this small sample, we chose not to present any 
data. Notwithstanding this fact, fraud companies were less likely to have a nominating committee (p-value = 
0.056), although this result only held in the 1991-1999 sub-period.   
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Table 19 – Board Leadership Issues  
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Percentage of companies where 
CEO/President and board chair 
were the same individual 
192 70% 68% 2%   105 70% 70% 0%   50 66% 58% 8%  
                  
Percentage of companies where 
CEO/President and the company 
founder were the same 
individual 
203 27% 22% 5%   113 29% 23% 6%   52 19% 19% 0%  
                  
Percentage of companies where 
the company founder served on 
the board  
203 42% 36% 6%   113 42% 36% 6%   52 35% 37% -2%  
                  
Percentage of board members 
who joined board after CEO 
appointed 
 
203 80% 77% 3%   113 82% 77% 5%   52 77% 77% 0%  
Percentage of companies where 
board had at least one non-
employee director related to an 
officer of the company 
203 6% 13% -7% 0.012  113 8% 11% -3%   52 2% 17% -15% 0.008 
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed). 
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Related Party Transactions 
 
As shown in Table 20, fraudulent financial reporting was more likely when a firm disclosed 
related party transactions. We found that 79 percent of fraud firms had disclosed a related 
party transaction in the proxy statement, as compared to 71 percent for no-fraud firms. 
That difference was statistically significant (p-value = 0.065). However, that difference was 
not statistically significant for either sub-period.  
 
For fraud firms, 26 percent of the 
related party transactions involved the 
founder, whereas 22 percent of the related 
party transactions involved the founder for 
the no-fraud firms. This difference was not 
statistically significant. Related party 
transactions involving the founder occurred 
less often in recent years.  
 
Just over 50 percent of the related party transactions involved the CEO, although 
there was no difference between the fraud and no-fraud firms on an overall basis or in 
either of the two sub-periods examined. Related party transactions involving other senior 
officers or involving board members occurred approximately 50 percent of the time, but 
there were no significant differences between fraud and no-fraud firms.  
 
 
Although over 70 percent of fraud 
and no-fraud firms disclosed related 
party transactions, fraud firms were 
significantly more likely to have 
disclosed a related party transaction 
than no-fraud firms. 
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Table 20 – Related Party Transactions 
 
 Full Sample 1991-1999 Sample  2001-2004 Sample 
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Percentage of companies with 
related party transactions 
disclosed in the proxy 
203 79% 71% 8% 0.065  113 75% 70% 5%   52 87% 77% 10%  
                  
Percentage of disclosed related 
party transactions that involved 
the founder 
117 26% 22% 4%   60 28% 27% 1%   35 14% 11% 3%  
                   
Percentage of disclosed related 
party transactions that involved 
the CEO 
117 51% 54% -3%   60 58% 53% 5%   35 31% 46% -15%  
                  
Percentage of disclosed related 
party transactions that involved 
other senior officers 
117 52% 50% 2%   60 47% 47% 0%   35 51% 51% 0%  
                  
Percentage of disclosed related 
party transactions that involved 
members of the board of 
directors 
117 61% 66% -5%   60 67% 67% 0%   35 51% 60% -9%  
                  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically significant (two-tailed).
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ISSUES RELATED TO THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
 
Auditors Associated With Fraud Companies 
 
We obtained information from the COMPUSTAT® database about the auditor who 
issued the audit opinion on the last set of audited financial statements issued during the 
fraud period to identify the auditor responsible for issuing the audit opinion on those 
fraudulently misstated financial statements. We were able to obtain information about 
the nature of the auditor’s opinion for the last fraudulently issued financial statements 
for 223 of the 347 fraud firms. We were able to obtain auditor data for 247 of the no-
fraud firms.23  
 
As reported in the pie charts in Table 21, we found that the Big Six/Four audited 
79 percent of the fraud companies (177 of the 223 fraud companies with available 
auditor information) in the last year of the fraud period. The next tier of four national 
audit firms beyond the Big Six/Four24 audited 6 percent (n = 13) of the fraud firm 
financial statements, while the remaining 15 percent (n = 33) of fraud firm financial 
statements were audited by non-national firms. These percentages were similar to the 
mix of auditor type for the 247 no-fraud audit firms where we could locate auditor 
information.  
 
Table 21 – Size of Audit Firms Issuing Reports on Fraudulent Financial 
Statements 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Our intent was not to compare the nature of audit opinion for a fraud firm and its similar no-fraud firm. 
Instead, we were interested in comparing auditor characteristics as a whole for each group (fraud firms 
and no-fraud firms). Thus, we did not need equal numbers of fraud and no-fraud firms for our auditor 
analysis.  
24 The next tier of four national audit firms is Grant Thornton LLP, BDO Seidman LLP, Crowe Chizek, and 
McGladrey LLP. 
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 We also reviewed information about the nature of the auditor’s opinion on the 
last set of financial statements that were fraudulently misstated to determine whether 
the auditor’s report contained any modifications or qualifications. For the 223 fraud 
companies where we were able to obtain audit opinion data from COMPUSTAT®, we 
determined that 97 of those 223 audit reports (43 percent) contained unqualified 
auditor opinions with no explanatory language. An additional 125 of the 223 fraud 
companies’ financial statements (56 percent) contained an auditor’s report that 
included an unqualified opinion along with explanatory language. Only one of the 223 
auditor opinions was qualified, and no audit opinion was issued for another of the 223 
fraud companies examined (collectively 1 percent).  
 
These results differ from the no-fraud firms. The majority of no-fraud firms (64 
percent (n = 158) of the 247 no-fraud firms where we had auditor report information) 
received unqualified audit opinions without any explanatory language, while the 
remaining 36 percent (n = 88) received unqualified opinions accompanied by 
explanatory language. No audit opinion was issued for one of the 247 no-fraud 
companies examined. See the pie charts in Table 22. More research is needed to 
examine the nature of the audit report modification and to determine if there is any 
relation between the report modification and the nature of the fraud technique 
employed. 
 
Table 22 – Types of Auditor Reports on Last Fraud Financial Statements 
 
 
 
   
Analysis of Auditor Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting 
 
Because of the significant time lag between the occurrence of fraud and the subsequent 
issuance by the SEC of an AAER, only a small percentage of the fraud companies had 
fraud periods extending into 2004 or later, the period when SOX Section 404 internal 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 67 
control audits became mandatory for accelerated filers (effective for fiscal years ended 
November 15, 2004 or later). We identified 24 fraud companies (40 company years, as 
some companies had fraud in 2004, 2005, and/or 2006) with fraud periods including 
2004 or later that might be subject to the Section 404 requirements, if the company was 
large enough to be an accelerated filer. Of these 40 company years, 18 did not appear to 
involve accelerated filers or the company failed to issue a 10-K. This leaves 22 company 
years for analysis. While we do provide this analysis, we caution readers about drawing 
conclusions about the impact of Section 404 based on this very small sample size.   
 
In 10 of the 22 cases (45 percent), the Section 404 opinion indicated that the 
company had effective internal control over financial reporting (see the pie chart in 
Table 23). Thus, the auditor concluded that controls were effective, even though the 
company was later determined to have fraudulently misstated its financial statements 
for this period. In another 10 cases (45 percent), the Section 404 opinion was adverse, 
indicating ineffective controls. However, in nine of these instances, the auditor’s report 
cited a financial restatement that had already occurred, and in the remaining case, the 
auditor cited amendments to the original 10-K that were filed immediately after the 
original 10-K filing (due to auditor-detected issues). Thus, in all of the instances where 
the auditor concluded that controls were ineffective, there had already been a financial 
restatement or other amendment of the 10-K. Finally, in two cases (10 percent), the 
original Section 404 opinion indicated effective controls, but the opinion was 
subsequently restated to indicate ineffective controls. In both cases, a company 
financial restatement apparently triggered the restatement of the auditor’s Section 404 
opinion. 
 
Overall, the analysis of Section 404 opinions for the 22 company years with 
available data indicates that the opinions indicated effective controls unless there had 
already been a financial restatement or amended 10-K. Thus, it does not appear that 
adverse Section 404 opinions were diagnostic of future misstatements, but rather 
simply reflected already-detected misstatements that resulted in financial restatements 
or amended 10-Ks. However, the small sample size provides a very limited perspective 
about Section 404 providing fraud detection capability. Further research is warranted 
to determine whether there are ways to improve auditors’ ability to detect internal 
control weaknesses that may lead to fraud in the future. Additionally, we are unable to 
assess whether Section 404 serves as a deterrent for management to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 68 
Table 23 – Analysis of Section 404 Internal Control Opinions 
         (n = 22 company-years) 
 
 
 
Note: In all cases where the Section 404 opinion indicated ineffective controls, the opinion cited a financial 
restatement or other amendment of the 10-K. 
 
 
Alleged Auditor Involvement in the Fraud 
 
In 22 percent of the cases (78 of 347 fraud cases), the external auditor was named in an 
AAER. In five of these 78 fraud cases, two different audit firms were named. Thus, the 
data in Table 24 describe the accusations against a total of 83 audit firms.25  
 
As indicated in Table 24, out of the 83 cases where the auditor was named, 32 
audit firms were charged with violating antifraud statutes (either Rule 10(b)-5 of the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act or charged with aiding and abetting others in a violation 
of Rule 10(b)-5). Of those 32 cases, 11 involved a national audit firm (Big Six/Four or 
the next tier of four national audit firms) and 21 involved a non-national audit firm. 
 
In the remaining 51 cases where the auditor was named, the auditor was 
accused of violating Rule 102(e) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act mostly for 
performing an alleged substandard audit. Out of these 51 cases, 22 involved a national 
audit firm, while 29 involved a non-national audit firm.  
 
                                                 
25 The SEC commonly names an individual auditor in the AAER instead of naming the entire audit firm. 
For ease of discussion, we refer to the “audit firm” to mean the employer of the named auditor or the firm 
itself. 
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The relative infrequency of enforcement actions against national firms relative 
to non-national firms is particularly striking, given that most of the fraud firms were 
audited by a national audit firm. Table 21 indicates that 88 percent of the fraud 
companies were audited by a national audit firm, yet only 40 percent of the 
enforcement actions (33 of 83 enforcement actions) were against a national audit firm 
(see Table 24).  
 
Table 24 – Frequency of Audit Firms Named in Enforcement Actions  
 
 
 
SEC Alleged Audit Firm Violation 
Auditors 
Named in 
AAER 
Number of 
National Firms 
Named 
Number of Non-
National Firms 
Named 
Anti-fraud statutes 32 11 21 
Non-fraud statutes including Rule 
102(e) 
51 22 29 
Total 83 33 50 
Note: There were 78 fraud cases in which the SEC named an individual at an audit firm or the audit firm 
itself in the AAER. For five of the 78 cases, the SEC named individuals at two different audit firms or two 
different audit firms. 
 
Auditor Changes During Fraud Period  
 
To determine whether fraud companies changed auditors just prior to or during the 
fraud period, we gathered COMPUSTAT® data to compare the name of the auditor 
associated with the last clean financial statements to the name of the auditor who 
issued an audit report on the last fraudulent financial statements. We were able to make 
that comparison for 184 similarly paired fraud and no-fraud firms. As reflected in the 
pie charts in Table 25, we found that 47 of 
the 184 fraud firms (26 percent) changed 
auditors between the period that the 
company issued the last clean financial 
statements and the period the company 
issued the last set of fraudulent financial 
statements. In contrast, only 22 of the 184 
no-fraud firms (12 percent) switched 
auditors over that same time frame. This 
difference was statistically significant (p-
value < 0.01).  
 
Most (60 percent) of the fraud firm auditor switches occurred during the fraud 
period, while the remaining 40 percent of fraud firm auditor switches occurred at the 
end of the last clean financial statement period (i.e., just before the fraud period began). 
Of the 47 instances of fraud companies switching auditors, 35 companies (74 percent) 
Twenty-eight percent of fraud 
companies switched auditors between 
the issuance of the last clean financial 
statements and the last set of 
fraudulently misstated financial 
statements, while 13 percent of no-
fraud firms switched auditors during 
the same time period. 
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switched from one national audit firm to another national audit firm, five (11 percent) 
switched from a national audit firm to a non-national audit firm, five (11 percent) 
switched from a non-national audit firm to a national audit firm, and two (4 percent) 
switched among non-national firms. In contrast, 16 of the 22 no-fraud firms (73 
percent) switching auditors changed from one national audit firm to another national 
audit firm, five (23 percent) switched from a national audit firm to a non-national audit 
firm, and one (4 percent) switched from a non-national firm to a national firm. 
 
Table 25 – Auditor Changes Just Prior To or During Fraud Period 
 
 
  
 
 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COMPANY AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED 
 
We attempted to identify consequences for companies engaging in fraudulent financial 
reporting once the fraud was revealed. First, we noted consequences described in the 
AAERs for each of the 347 fraud companies.  
 
Table 26 presents information in the AAERs on the sanctions imposed by the 
SEC against both companies and individuals as a result of the fraud.26 The most 
common sanctions were cease and desist orders, officer and director and SEC bars, and 
monetary penalties. A cease and desist order compels a party to stop engaging in 
certain behavior, and the recipient of such an order can be a company or an individual. 
A cease and desist order is the mildest sanction that the SEC can impose in a fraud case, 
and it was the most commonly employed sanction (89 percent of the fraud companies 
received a cease and desist order). Generally, the SEC issues a cease and desist order in 
                                                 
26 Frequencies of consequences reported in this section are inherently understated given that we were 
only able to identify consequences explicitly noted in an AAER or in business press articles. Given that the 
business press often does not cover smaller or otherwise less visible companies, there were likely to be 
many consequences that occurred that we were unable to identify for some of our sample firms.  
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addition to other sanctions. However, in 29 percent of the cases, the SEC issued a cease 
and desist order without issuing any other sanctions.  
 
The SEC can bar an individual from serving as an officer or a director of a public 
company, either for a period of time or permanently. This is a severe sanction, as it 
seriously affects the economic situation of an 
individual receiving such a bar. In almost half 
of the fraud cases (47 percent), one or more 
individuals received an officer and director 
bar. In addition, outside professionals (e.g., 
accountants, attorneys, etc.) can be barred 
from practicing before the SEC, either temporarily or permanently. In 46 percent of the 
fraud cases, one or more outside professionals was subject to an SEC bar.  
 
SEC sanctions can involve monetary penalties, either fines or disgorgements. 
Fines can be levied against companies and individuals, and were imposed in 65 percent 
of the fraud cases. A disgorgement involves returning monies inappropriately received 
as a result of the fraud. For example, an individual might be required to disgorge a 
bonus received based on fraudulently reported income or the proceeds from a stock 
sale when the stock price was inflated as a result of the fraud. Disgorgements were 
ordered in 43 percent of the fraud cases.  
 
Table 26 – Consequences Based on AAER Information (n = 347) 
 
 
 
Table 27 presents information on the monetary penalties imposed by the SEC – 
for cases in which the dollar amounts were disclosed in the AAERs. The average fine 
imposed by the SEC was $12.4 million, and the median was $100,000 (maximum fine 
Fines were imposed in 65 percent of 
the cases, while disgorgements were 
imposed in 43 percent of the cases. 
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was $750 million). The cumulative fines for all 347 fraud cases imposed by the SEC 
totaled $2.74 billion. The mean and median disgorgement amounts were $18.1 million 
and $195,000, respectively (maximum amount of a disgorgement was $700 million). 
Cumulative disgorgements across all of the 347 fraud cases totaled $2.65 billion.  
 
Table 27 – Fines and Disgorgements Based on AAER Information (n = 347) 
 
 
 
Description 
of Penalty 
 
Number of 
Companies 
Identified 
Cumulative 
Amount Paid 
by All 
Companies 
Mean 
Amount Paid 
by a Single 
Company 
Median 
Amount Paid 
by a Single 
Company 
 
 
Maximum 
Paid 
Fines and 
settlements 
221 $2.74 billion $12.4 million $100,000 $750 
million 
Disgorgements 146 $2.65 billion $18.1 million $195,000 $700 
million 
 
Other Consequences for Companies 
 
To identify other consequences to the fraud companies for engaging in fraudulent 
financial reporting, we performed extensive searches of electronic databases of 
business press articles appearing during the period beginning with the calendar year 
that coincides with the last year of the fraud and ending with the calendar year two 
years after the SEC issued the last AAER related to the fraud.  
 
We also performed the search of business press articles for the sample of no-
fraud companies. This allows us to determine whether the rate of subsequent 
consequences was different for fraud companies relative to a similar set of companies 
not engaging in fraud during the same time periods.  
 
Recall in our earlier analysis of board governance characteristics that we were 
able to generate a sample of 203 fraud and 203 similar no-fraud firms. As discussed in 
that section, we were unable to examine board governance variables for the full sample 
of 347 firms due to the lack of available proxy statements for some firms. For our 
business press searches, we were able to expand our sample to 311 fraud and 311 no-
fraud firms (we were not able to identify a similar no-fraud company in 36 cases). 
 
 In addition to SEC sanctions (e.g., fines, disgorgements, cease and desist orders), 
companies can suffer other consequences either directly, or indirectly, as a result of the 
fraud. We examined the incidence of financial failure (bankruptcy, liquidation, etc.), 
stock exchange delisting, and material asset sales for the fraud companies and the 
comparable percentages for the no-fraud sample.  
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 As shown in Table 28, 28 percent of the fraud companies failed (filed for 
bankruptcy, were liquidated, etc.) within two years of the latest AAER issued by the 
SEC. The comparable percentage for the no-
fraud companies was 13 percent. The 
probability of bankruptcy or other failure for 
a fraud firm was statistically larger than for a 
no-fraud firm (p-value < 0.001). Similarly, 
fraud firms were significantly more likely 
than no-fraud firms to be involuntarily 
delisted from a stock exchange (p-value < 
0.001). Almost half (47 percent) of fraud 
firms suffered by being delisted by a stock 
exchange, whereas only 20 percent of no-fraud firms were delisted during a similar 
time period. Finally, 62 percent of fraud companies compared to 31 percent of no-fraud 
companies engaged in a material asset sale (p-value < 0.001).  
 
All of the above metrics clearly indicate that fraud firms were more likely to 
suffer adverse financial outcomes than no-fraud firms. These differences were likely 
due to the fact that companies that experienced operating difficulties chose to engage in 
fraud to mask these difficulties, and to the direct and indirect costs associated with 
fraud (e.g., legal fees, fines, investigations, reputation damage, loss of personnel, loss of 
customers, etc.).  
 
Table 28 – Other Consequences to Companya (n = 311)b 
 
 
 
Subsequent 
Consequences 
 
Fraud 
Companies 
Affected 
Percentage 
of Fraud 
Companies 
Affected 
 
No-Fraud 
Companies 
Affected 
Percentage 
of No-Fraud 
Companies 
Affected 
 
 
 
p-valuec 
Bankrupt, liquidated, etc. 86 28% 39 13% 0.001 
Involuntary stock exchange 
delistingd 
 
147 47% 61 20% 0.001 
Material asset sales 193 62% 96 31% 0.001 
a The consequences of the fraud were examined from the beginning of the last fraud year until two years after the year of the 
last AAER related to the fraud. The occurrence of these events at the  no-fraud companies was examined during the identical 
time period. 
 
b There were 311 fraud companies where a similar no-fraud company could be identified.  
 
c Tests of statistical differences were performed using Wilcoxon’s signed rank test. 
 
d Includes revocation of a firm’s registration with the SEC. 
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically 
significant (two-tailed). 
 
Fraud firms filed for bankruptcy or 
were delisted from a stock exchange 
significantly more often in the time 
period following the fraud than 
their counterpart no-fraud firms in 
that same time period.  
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Stock Price Reaction 
 
To further examine the effect of the fraud on the company, we examined the stock price 
reaction for two different dates related to the disclosure of the alleged financial 
statement fraud. First, we examined the stock price reaction to the initial disclosure of 
the fraud. Second, we examined the stock price reaction to the initial disclosure of an 
investigation by the SEC or the Department of Justice.  
 
We identified the date of the initial disclosure of an alleged financial statement 
fraud by searching for the initial press disclosure of a potential accounting impropriety. 
We took this approach since the initial press disclosure of an alleged accounting 
impropriety may not specifically indicate that a fraud has occurred, given that in many 
instances an investigation has yet to be commenced. Because that initial disclosure may 
or may not suggest to the markets the existence of a possible fraud, we identified a 
second date to measure stock market reactions. That date represents the date of the 
SEC’s or Department of Justice’s first public disclosure of an investigation. 
 
We measured the stock reaction on these two different disclosure dates by 
calculating the abnormal stock returns using methodologies widely used in research to 
capture unique stock reactions to disclosures of new information to the capital markets. 
An abnormal stock return basically captures the portion of the change in stock price 
attributable to the company-specific news disclosed on that date and does not include 
normal changes for that firm’s stock given changes in overall market conditions.27 
  
Initial Disclosure of Potential Accounting Improprieties 
 
For each of the two different disclosure events described above, we measured the 
abnormal returns over three different days. First, we measured the abnormal return in 
the day prior to the initial disclosure of the fraud (referred to as Day -1). Measuring 
stock market reactions on the day prior to the date of disclosure captures any stock 
market reaction to potential leakage of information in the day prior to disclosure. Next, 
we measured the abnormal return on the day of disclosure (referred to as Day 0). 
Finally, we measured the abnormal return on the day following the date of disclosure, 
which captures the stock price reaction on the next trading day following the date of 
disclosure (referred to as Day +1).  
 
Table 29 provides information about the abnormal returns measured on each of 
these three days surrounding the first public disclosure of an alleged financial 
statement fraud. That table also shows the cumulative abnormal return for Days 0 and 
+1 on a combined basis, which is consistent with typical abnormal stock return 
                                                 
27 We calculated abnormal returns using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and 
the Eventus program, using the market model with an equally weighted index consistent with prior 
research methodologies (see DeFond et al. (2007) and MacKinlay (1997)). We estimated the market 
model parameters using a 120-day estimation window consistent with prior research methodologies (see 
Palmrose et al. 2004). Given the small size of some of the fraud companies, firms were retained in the 
sample if 30 days or more of stock returns were available during the 120-day estimation window. 
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research. The abnormal returns reported in Table 29 are shown in percentage form to 
provide an indication of the percentage change in stock price to the initial disclosure of 
alleged financial statement fraud. 
 
As expected, the average abnormal returns for each of the three days and the 
cumulative two days (Days 0 and +1) surrounding the first public disclosure of an 
alleged fraud were negative. The p-values for 
each day indicate that all of the negative 
abnormal stock returns were highly 
statistically significant. The mean abnormal 
return on Day -1 was -1.4 percent, suggesting 
some market reaction to potential leakage of 
news of an alleged fraud. The mean stock 
price reaction on the day of disclosure (Day 
0) jumped to -10.0 percent, followed by an additional -7.3 percent return on Day +1. 
The cumulative average negative abnormal return of -16.7 percent on Days 0 and +1 
indicates an abnormal stock price decline of 16.7 percent over the two-day period 
surrounding the initial news of fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Table 29 – Abnormal Stock Returns Surrounding First Public Disclosure of 
Potential Accounting Irregularities 
 
 Percentage Abnormal Stock Return 
 Day -1  
(n=221)a 
Day 0 
(n=213) a 
Day +1 
(n=198) a 
Days 0 and +1 
(n=215) a 
Mean -1.4% -10.0% -7.3% -16.7% 
Standard 
deviation 
0.07 0.19 0.17 0.23 
     
1st quartile -2.5% -17.2% -12.6% -28.6% 
Median -0.5% -3.3% -2.2% -11.1% 
3rd quartile 1.4% 0.4% 1.5% -1.7% 
     
t-statistic -3.21 -23.19 -16.89 -27.25 
p-value 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
     
a Of the 347 fraud firms, stock price information was not provided for 73 firms in the CRSP database, and we were 
unable to identify a unique date of the public disclosure of the potential accounting irregularity for 15 additional 
firms. Finally, stock price information for some of the days (-1, 0, or +1) was missing for between 38 and 61 firms, 
depending on the date of interest. Thus, the number of firms for each of the measurement dates differed slightly.  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically 
significant (two-tailed). 
Stock prices declined 17 percent on 
average (beyond normal market 
movement) across two days 
surrounding the initial disclosure of 
alleged fraud. 
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Initial Disclosure of SEC/Department of Justice Investigation 
 
Table 30 provides information about the abnormal stock returns for the three days (-1, 
0, and +1) surrounding the first public disclosure of a governmental investigation of the 
potential accounting improprieties, whether that investigation was commenced by the 
SEC or by the U.S. Department of Justice. The average abnormal stock return was -0.5 
percent on Day -1, but this was not statistically significant, suggesting that the 
announcement of a governmental investigation did not leak into the market before the 
investigation was announced. However, the mean abnormal returns on day 0 and +1 
were -4.9 percent and -2.5 percent, respectively, which were both statistically 
significant. Thus, the disclosure of a government investigation of alleged financial 
statement fraud resulted in an average 
abnormal stock price decline over a two-
day period of 7.3 percent. 
 
It is interesting to note that these 
stock price declines were smaller in 
magnitude than those surrounding the 
initial press disclosure of the potential 
accounting improprieties. Nevertheless, the 
announcement of a governmental 
investigation, while not typically providing 
the initial disclosure of the potential accounting improprieties, did provide incremental 
information to the market. The market may have reacted to the realities of costs 
associated with responding to a governmental investigation and to the adverse 
reputational consequences for the firm. 
 
 
 
Stock prices declined over 7 percent 
on average (beyond normal market 
movement) over the two-day period 
surrounding announcement by the 
SEC or Department of Justice of an 
investigation about alleged financial 
statement fraud. 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:  1998-2007, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
 
www.coso.org Page 77 
 
Table 30 – Abnormal Stock Returns Surrounding First Public Disclosure of SEC or 
Department of Justice Investigation 
 
 Percentage Abnormal Stock Return 
 Day -1  
(n=142)a 
Day 0 
(n=142) a 
Day +1 
(n=140) a 
Days 0 and +1 
(n=143) a 
Mean -0.5% -4.9% -2.5% -7.3% 
Standard 
deviation 
0.09 0.13 0.11 0.16 
     
1st quartile -1.5% -8.0% -6.3% -13.6% 
Median -0.2% -2.2% -1.2% -4.0% 
3rd quartile 1.6% 0.5% 1.9% -0.3% 
     
t-statistic -1.09 -10.29 -5.39 -10.96 
p-value 0.28 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
     
a Of the 347 fraud firms, stock price information was not provided for 73 firms in the CRSP database, and we were 
unable to identify a unique date of the public disclosure of the SEC’s or Department of Justice’s investigation for 78 
firms. Finally, stock price information for some of the days (-1, 0, or +1) was missing for between 53 and 56 firms, 
depending on the date of interest. Thus, the number of firms for each of the measurement dates differed slightly.  
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically 
significant (two-tailed). 
 
Other Consequences for Individuals  
 
In addition to SEC sanctions (e.g., fines, disgorgements, SEC officer and director bars, 
etc.) described earlier, individuals involved with a fraud can suffer other consequences 
in the labor market. We examined turnover (including the specific reason for the 
turnover) for the CEO, CFO, chairman of the board, and other board members. In 
addition, we considered criminal indictments and convictions of the CEO and CFO. We 
examined consequences of the fraud for individuals that occurred between the 
beginning of the last fraud year through two years after the year of the last AAER 
related to the fraud.  
 
Table 31 presents this information. Because we captured information about 
management changes and other events, it was important that we contrasted the 
experience of fraud firms with a similar set of no-fraud firms. Thus, Table 31 shows 
results for both fraud and no-fraud firms. We tracked similar consequences for no-fraud 
firms over the same time frame used for their related fraud firms. We were able to find 
similar no-fraud firms for 311 of the 347 fraud firms.  
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 In most cases, turnover occurred for the CEO and CFO positions of companies 
committing fraud. Eighty-two percent of the CEOs and 80 percent of the CFOs of fraud 
firms experienced turnover. The comparable percentages for the no-fraud firms were 
47 percent for CEOs and 49 percent for CFOs, significantly lower (p-value = 0.001). A 
large majority of the CEO and CFO turnover was due to resignations, although we 
cannot observe how many of these resignations were forced. Seven percent of the fraud 
companies experienced CEO terminations while 59 percent experienced CEO 
resignations. In contrast, during the same time 
period no-fraud firms terminated two percent 
of their CEOs, while 21 percent of the no-fraud 
firm CEOs resigned. A similar pattern existed for 
CFO turnover at the fraud and no-fraud 
companies. That suggests that fraud revelations 
often result in significantly greater management 
changes. 
 
Twenty-one percent (17 percent) of the fraud CEOs (CFOs) were criminally 
indicted, whereas virtually none of the no-fraud CEOs or CFOs was criminally indicated 
over the same time periods (statistically significant (p-value = 0.001)). For fraud firms, 
64 percent of the CEOs criminally indicted were convicted (41/64), whereas 75 percent 
of the CFOs criminally indicted were convicted (39/52). This difference likely reflects 
the greater difficulty that CFOs have in denying that they had any knowledge of the 
fraud given the CFO’s responsibility for the firm’s finances.  
 
For fraud firms, approximately two-thirds of board chairs and other board 
members left the board, whereas only 25 percent of board chairs and 40 percent of 
other board members left the boards of no-fraud firms, significantly lower (p-value = 
0.001). As was the case with CEO and CFO turnover, resignation was the most common 
reason given for the departure. Fifteen percent (32 of 211 instances) of the board chair 
turnover at fraud firms was due to the board 
chair being terminated, whereas only 11 percent 
(9 of 79 instances) of the board chair turnover at 
no-fraud firms was due to a termination. Also, if 
there was turnover of the CEO, CFO, or board 
chair, the board chair was most likely to be fired. 
Turnover of other board members at both fraud 
and no-fraud firms was overwhelmingly due to 
resignations, but terminations of other board members occurred in six percent of the 
fraud firms. We identified only one instance where a non-chair board member at a no-
fraud firm was terminated.  
Eighty percent or more of CEOs 
and CFOs turned over following 
the disclosure of the alleged fraud. 
Approximately 20 percent of CEOs 
and CFOs of fraud companies were 
criminally indicted, and about two-
thirds of those indictments ultimately 
led to criminal convictions. 
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Table 31 – Consequences to Individuals (n = 311)  
 
 
Subsequent 
Consequencesa 
Number of 
Fraud 
Firms 
Affected 
Percentage 
of Fraud 
Firms 
Affected 
Number of 
No-Fraud 
Firms 
Affected 
Percentage 
of No-Fraud 
Firms 
Affected 
 
 
 
p-valueb 
CEO turnover: 
CEO turnover: 
255 82% 147 47% 0.001 
 Fi ing/dismissal 23 7% 5 2%  
 Resignation 185 59% 66 21%  
 Retirement 17 6% 24 8%  
 Another position 14 5% 17 5%  
 Other 16 5% 35 11%  
      
CFO turnover: 250 80% 153 49% 0.001 
 Firing/dismissal 25 8% 3 1%  
 Resignation 157 51% 64 21%  
 Retirement 14 4% 18 6%  
 Another position 39 12% 55 18%  
 Other 15 5% 13 4%  
      
CEO criminal indictment 64 21% 1 < 1% 0.001 
      
CEO criminal conviction 41 13% 1 < 1% 0.010 
      
CFO criminal indictment 52 17% 1 < 1% 0.001 
      
CFO criminal conviction 39 13% 0 0% 0.010 
      
Chairman of board 
turnover: 
211 68% 79 25% 0.001 
 Firing/dismissal 32 10% 9 3%  
 Resignation 147 47% 48 15%  
 Retirement 16 5% 12 4%  
 Another position 4 1% 0 0%  
 Other 12 4% 10 3%  
      
Other board turnover: 212 68% 123 40% 0.001 
 Firing/dismissal 19 6% 1 < 1%  
 Resignation 177 57% 103 33%  
 Retirement 4 1% 7 2%  
 Another position 2 1% 5 2%  
 Other 10 3% 7 2%  
      a The consequences of the fraud for individuals were examined from the beginning of the last fraud year until two years after 
the year of the last AAER related to the fraud. The occurrence of these events for individuals at the no-fraud firms was 
examined during the identical time period.  
b Tests of statistical significance were performed using the Wilcoxon’s signed rank test. 
 
 
 
Note: A p-value that is less than 0.10 indicates that the difference between fraud and no-fraud firms was statistically 
significant (two-tailed). 
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IV. Conclusion 
  
We believe that our analysis of fraudulent financial reporting from 1998-2007 reveals 
several key messages. First, the financial statement fraud problem still exists and 
warrants continued attention. The SEC alleged that 347 public companies committed 
fraud over the ten-year period 1998-2007. The magnitude of individual fraud cases and 
the size of fraud companies both increased markedly from COSO’s 1999 report. The 
major accounting scandals of the early 2000s involved larger frauds and larger 
companies, which contributed to the nearly $120 billion in cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation across all frauds in the ten-year period. Because the number of frauds 
examined in this study involving financial reporting periods after the passage of the 
SOX is very limited, further research is needed to assess the effects of the SOX in 
addressing fraud. 
 
Second, the SEC continues to name individuals in the C-suite for some alleged 
involvement in the fraud, even more so than in the past. During 1998-2007, the CEO 
and/or CFO were named in an AAER in nearly 90 percent of the cases. Boards, auditors, 
and regulators need to seek additional tools to assess management integrity and 
susceptibility to fraud pressures. Research about leadership and organizational 
behavior may help to provide insights about potential drivers of financial statement 
fraud. 
 
Third, revenue fraud continues to emerge as the leading type of fraud, now 
accounting for over 60 percent of SEC fraud cases. Additional research into revenue 
fraud methods, especially industry-specific studies, may reveal new ways to address 
this risk area. 
 
Fourth, board governance characteristics often do not differ meaningfully 
between fraud and no-fraud firms. These characteristics have been the focus of recent 
regulation, thus reducing or even eliminating previous fraud/no-fraud differences. 
Future research on governance processes and the interaction of various governance 
mechanisms may be needed to identify less-observable governance differences 
associated with fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Fifth, fraud companies are twice as likely to change auditors as no-fraud firms 
between the last clean financial statements and the last fraudulent financial statements. 
More research is needed to fully understand the relation between auditor change and 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Finally, the consequences of fraud are severe for individuals and companies. 
Individuals may face civil fines, SEC bars, disgorgement, and criminal prosecution. 
Fraud companies experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines, and 
they face bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do 
no-fraud firms. 
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CALL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
 
COSO sponsored this study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission between January 1998 and December 
2007. This study updates our understanding of fraudulent financial reporting since 
COSO’s 1999 issuance of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997.  
 
COSO’s mission is to provide thought leadership through the development of 
comprehensive frameworks, guidance, and research on enterprise risk management, 
internal control, and fraud deterrence. COSO’s efforts are designed to improve 
organizational performance and governance and to reduce the extent of fraud in 
organizations.  
 
COSO hopes that those involved in financial reporting will carefully consider the 
results reported in this study and recommit their efforts to improve the prevention, 
deterrence, and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. While several insights from 
this study are discussed within this document, more research is needed to better 
understand fraudulent financial reporting. COSO encourages other thought leaders to 
creatively explore new and different ways to reduce occurrences of fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
 
COSO, 2010 
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